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THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN TRADEMARK LAW 
Michael Grynberg* 
Abstract: This article considers the judicial role in developing trademark 
law. The issue is important because proposals for trademark reform often 
rest on expansive, but unexamined, conceptions of judicial authority. In 
thinking about trademark reform, we should broaden our perspective to 
include considerations of what we want from the law in general. Our an-
swer to the question of what judges applying the Lanham Act should do 
may vary depending on whether we respond as subjects of trademark law 
(i.e., as consumers or sellers); as litigants to a trademark action; or as 
third parties whose focus is not on trademark law, but the general opera-
tion of the legal system.  Thinking about contested trademark policies in 
this manner provides an alternative basis for explaining, critiquing, and 
reforming modern doctrine. 
Introduction 
 What is the judicial role in developing trademark law? One answer 
is that it is the same as any other body of law: the principles that guide a 
judge in administering, say, ERISA also apply to trademark law. 
 But that’s too facile. However seamless law’s web,1 each strand has 
its nuances. Trademark’s begin with being a branch of intellectual 
property (“IP”) law. Trademark law vests private actors with quasi-
regulatory power by granting rights in intangible goods (albeit on a 
theory different from that at work in copyright and patent law).2 Judi-
cial management of these powers must accommodate trademark’s 
common law history and its substantial, but incomplete, codification by 
the Lanham Act.3 That statute, in turn, contains both delegating and 
non-delegating provisions. Some sections authorize courts to continue 
developing trademark law; others leave less room for judicial action. 
Trademark’s factual inquiry, moreover, is complicated. To measure “li-
 
* © 2011, Michael Grynberg, Associate Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University 
School of Law. Comments welcome at mgrynberg@okcu.edu. 
1 F.W. Maitland, A Prologue to a History of English Law, 14 Law Q. Rev. 13, 13 (1898) 
(“Such is the unity of all history that any one who endeavours to tell a piece of it must feel 
that his first sentence tears a seamless web.”). 
2 See infra notes 246–256 and accompanying text. 
3 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1141n (West 2009 & Supp. 2011). 
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kelihood of confusion,” fact finders must put themselves in the shoes of 
relevant consumers while accommodating the effect of their own con-
ceptions. Last, the Lanham Act’s administration implicates external 
bodies of law (e.g., the First Amendment) that require harmonization 
in a manner sensitive to each doctrine’s respective requirements.4 We 
therefore need more than a general attitude about the judicial role to 
have much to say about what is appropriate in trademark. 
 Thinking about trademark-specific issues in conjunction with 
broader legal concerns is nonetheless worthwhile. Trademark’s expan-
sion has prompted criticism for threatening expressive and consumer 
interests.5 Reform efforts are less likely to succeed without an accurate 
survey of the scope of judicial authority. Consider the problem of 
trademark defenses. Even if responsibility for trademark’s expansion 
falls in part on “activist” judging,6 the same judicial energy is not neces-
sarily available to respond to trademark’s growth. In a recent article, I 
argue that the Lanham Act’s particular mix of delegating and non-
delegating language gives judges less room than commonly thought to 
craft defenses to liability.7 Others disagree.8 The issue underscores the 
need for an accurate conception of what judges can and cannot do to 
develop trademark law. Policy prescriptions directed at judges mean 
little if they are crafted without regard to the boundaries of judicial dis-
cretion. Judges care about more than substantive policy. And if reform-
ers want courts to take their prescriptions seriously, they should too. 
 The limits of the judicial role in trademark law should also interest 
those outside trademark and its policy debates. Disputes over statutory 
interpretation and implementation are unending. Stepping back from 
these broad arguments to consider how our views play out in a particu-
lar area of law may be a useful test of intuitions. Trademark offers fer-
                                                                                                                      
4 See infra notes 120–130 and accompanying text. 
5 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367, 486–87 (1999) 
(“[W]e have divorced trademark law from its historical and sensible policy focus on the 
probability of material confusion, and crafted an overbroad, ill-considered legal regime 
that serves simply to enrich certain trademark owners at the expense of consumers, the 
market’s competitive structure, and the public interest more generally.”). 
6 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“I think it is important to recognize that the meaning of the 
[Lanham Act] text has been transformed by the federal courts over the past few dec-
ades.”). 
7 See Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a “For-
malist” Age, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 897, 901–02 (2009). 
8 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. 99, 137 (2009) (“[T]he basic theory of the Lanham Act allows greater common law 
development of defenses by courts.”). 
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tile ground for this kind of examination in part because judicial views 
on the subject, at least at the Supreme Court level, are relatively non-
ideological.9 
 What then is the judicial role in trademark’s future? It is true that 
judges always have been, and will continue to be, partners with Con-
gress in shaping the contours of trademark doctrine.10 But granting the 
existence of a judicial role leaves the work of mapping its parameters. 
This article surveys the boundaries in light not only of what we want 
from trademark law, but from the law in general. Considering trade-
mark law from a perspective outside trademark’s substance provides an 
alternative basis for evaluating recent precedents. 
 Developing this perspective requires asking whether there is much 
to say about the proper judicial role independent of one’s substantive 
trademark views. Norms of judicial behavior are contested, but there 
may be some common ground that may provide guidance in cases 
where policy considerations are indeterminate. These conceptions may 
or may not trump the substantive considerations of any given case. To 
the extent there are tradeoffs between optimal trademark and judicial 
policy, however, they should still be identified and addressed directly.11 
 If we want to know what the judicial role in trademark law should 
be, we must first ask what we want from trademark law. Our answers 
depend on whether we ask as beneficiaries or subjects of trademark law 
(i.e., consumers or sellers), litigants in a trademark action, or third par-
                                                                                                                      
9 The Supreme Court’s recent trademark jurisprudence is unclouded by the political 
divides that attend some of the justices’ methodological debates, and the Court has 
reached unanimous results in every trademark case it has decided in recent years. See, e.g., 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000). To be sure, the opinions occasionally betray a 
methodological debate insofar as Justice Antonin Scalia often refrains from joining opin-
ions to the extent that they cite legislative history. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Last-
ing Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114 n.* (2004); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 
537 U.S. 418, 420 n.* (2003). Moreover, the generalization is showing signs of breaking 
down in other areas of IP law. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231–32 (2010) (affirm-
ing rejection of patent but dividing 5–4 on the rationale with divide tracking popular con-
ceptions of liberal/conservative divide on court); cf. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, 
S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565, 565 (2010) (mem.) (affirming the Ninth Circuit on its application of 
copyright’s first-sale doctrine as an equally divided Court). 
10 Graeme Dinwoodie, The Common Law and Trade Marks in an Age of Statutes, in The 
Common Law of Intellectual Property: Essays in Honour of Professor David Vav-
er 331, 333 (Catherine W. Ng, Lionel Bently & Giuseppina D’Agostino eds., 2010) 
(“[D]espite substantial legislative intervention, both Congress and the Supreme Court 
appear content that the development of trademark and unfair competition law in the 
United States remain heavily dependent on common law law-making by the courts.”). 
11 See infra notes 42–73 and accompanying text. 
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ties whose attention is on the legal system more generally. These view-
points correspond with what Part I describes as trademark’s substantive, 
administration, and “system” goals.12 Part II discusses ways in which 
trademark’s non-substantive goals may explain some of its substantive 
doctrines.13 Consistent with the conception of the judicial role devel-
oped in Part I, the partnership between courts and Congress on display 
in these cases does not open the door to unbounded judicial discretion 
or extensive rulemaking in the common law style.14 Part III discusses 
ways in which current practices undermine administration and system 
goals.15 The Conclusion offers suggestions for reform.16 
I. What Do We Want from Trademark Law? 
 This Part distinguishes between trademark’s traditional substantive 
concerns and broader administration and “system” goals. While most 
analyses of trademark’s doctrinal developments focus on substance, 
consideration of these goals is part of any complete assessment of 
trademark judging. 
A. Trademark’s Substance 
 The natural place to start is with the perspective of the subjects of 
trademark law: consumers and sellers who are concerned primarily with 
the law’s substance. Trademark law regulates the source identification of 
goods and services in the marketplace. It does so to protect the interests 
of consumers and sellers alike.17 For consumers, trademarks prevent 
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra notes 17–89 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 90–164 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 90–164 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 165–260 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 261–271 and accompanying text. 
17 There is some debate about whether trademark is “really” more about the consumer 
or the seller. Compare, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 
82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1839, 1840–41 (2007) (“[T]rademark law was not traditionally 
intended to protect consumers. Instead, trademark law, like all unfair competition law, 
sought to protect producers from illegitimate diversions of their trade by competitors.”), 
with Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 
86 B.U. L. Rev. 547, 561 n.59 (2006) (“The problem with a project like Professor McKen-
na’s is similar to interpreting an Escher print. Everything depends on what one sees as the 
foreground (protecting consumers or protecting sellers) and what one sees as the back-
ground—and both perspectives are necessary to fully appreciate the whole.”), and Michael 
Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 60, 116–17 (2008) 
(questioning whether protection of goodwill has any legitimate meaning independent of 
consumer interests). But the standard account is what follows. See infra note 19 and ac-
companying text. 
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fraud. They ensure that the Pepsi purchaser gets Pepsi and not Coke. 
Providing a clear signal of source also lowers search costs, reducing the 
time needed to study product attributes.18 These consumer advantages 
also benefit sellers who may invest in developing goodwill with the pub-
lic without fear that the competition will try to trade on their mark. 
 The view that trademark law vindicates both buyer and seller in-
terests is old.19 Despite their shared history, these ends are sometimes 
incompatible, especially when trademark rights are asserted outside the 
traditional “passing off” context.20 Judicial efforts to police pre-sale 
(“initial interest”) confusion,21 post-sale confusion,22 merchandising,23 
                                                                                                                      
18 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law 166–68 (2003). There are challenges to this happy account. 
See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566–67 (9th Cir. 1968) (summarizing critiques 
that characterize trademarks as barriers to market entry); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confu-
sion, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 721, 729–38 (2004). But it is nevertheless well rooted in mod-
ern case law. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“In 
principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark, 
‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions.’” (quoting 
1 J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 2.01[2], at 2–3 
(3d ed. 1994))); McKenna, supra note 17, at 1844 (“It would be difficult to overstate the 
level of consensus among commentators that the goal of trademark law is—and always has 
been—to improve the quality of information in the marketplace and thereby reduce con-
sumer search costs.”). 
19 See S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274. 
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect 
the public so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a 
particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it 
asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has 
spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is 
protected in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. 
Id. 
20 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 cmt. d (1995) (describing the 
issue in the earliest trademark cases as “whether the defendant had imitated the plaintiff’s 
mark for the purpose of misrepresenting the defendant’s goods as those of the plaintiff” 
and explaining that “[t]hese actions eventually evolved into a distinct tort of ‘passing off,’ 
or ‘unfair competition’ as it came to be known in the United States”). 
21 Initial interest confusion is confusion that is dispelled before the point of sale (e.g., 
the customer reaches for a PEPSI thinking it is a COKE, but realizes the difference before 
making a purchase decision). 
22 Post-sale confusion is confusion that is experienced after the purchase is made (e.g., 
an onlooker sees someone wearing a knock-off ROLEX watch and thinks the wearer has an 
authentic device). 
23 Some trademark owners claim an exclusive right to market products in which the 
trademark is the product and not primarily a source identifier (e.g., a BOSTON RED SOX 
cap). 
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or mistaken perceptions of approval24 provoke debate over whether 
protection of seller goodwill comes at the expense of consumer inter-
ests. These arguments tend to concern whether novel trademark ac-
tions serve trademark’s core policies, not whether these policies are 
valid goals in the first place.25 
 Trademark’s substance also encompasses related interests. Most 
notably, trademark law is supposed to promote, not undermine, com-
petition.26 It therefore withholds protection from functional product 
designs, lest a trademark be used to obtain a monopoly on the good.27 
Here, too, consumer and seller interests may conflict. Aesthetic or or-
namental styles may define product categories such that trademark 
protection would harm competition—if, for example, the makers of 
silverware could have exclusive rights to utensils in a baroque style.28 
Courts nonetheless fear pushing this principle too far, lest trademark 
creators refrain from imbuing their marks with distinctive qualities.29 
 The concern over the availability of competitive alternatives ex-
tends to trademarks themselves. Sellers have only limited ability to 
claim trademarks in descriptive words and cannot receive protection 
for generic terms.30 Courts applying these rules balance their competi-
tion-promoting goals with the prospect that consumers will be deceived 
if the marks in question are not protected.31 
                                                                                                                      
24 Several trademark owners have attempted to police uses of their marks where the 
purported confusion is over whether permission was required for the mark to be depicted 
(e.g., a requirement that the National Football League approve its marks for use in a fic-
tional depiction of professional football). 
25 But see supra note 17. In addition, moral considerations sometimes pop up in trade-
mark precedents, but they are not central to modern doctrine. See Robert G. Bone, En-
forcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 Va. L. Rev. 2099, 2108–14 (2004) (outlining moral 
arguments for trademark protection). The existence of such arguments still underscores 
the potential instability of using what trademark is “about” to resolve contested questions. 
26 S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (“Trade-
marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice be-
tween competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other.”). 
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2006). 
28 Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80–81 (2d Cir. 
1990). 
29 See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1073–74 
(9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting claim that trademarks were a functional feature of the defen-
dant’s product). This desire is largely external to trademark’s traditional rationales and 
more in keeping with incentive stories of IP. See infra notes 249–252 and accompanying 
text. 
30 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–10 (2d. Cir. 1976) 
(explaining the limitations on generic and descriptive marks). 
31 See Grynberg, supra note 17, at 93–94 (explaining doctrines in which courts balance 
the effects of challenged practices on confused and nonconfused consumers). 
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 These latter doctrines serve the related goal of ensuring a free flow 
of information to consumers. Various trademark “fair use” doctrines try 
to prevent trademark rights from blocking dissemination of informa-
tion.32 The information in need of protection may be general market-
place information, but it also includes expressive content.33 Trademark 
law therefore requires accommodation of free speech principles, pre-
senting another potential spectrum of substantive dispute.34 
B. Trademark’s Administration 
 Our perspective on trademark law’s goals could be narrower and 
focus on parties to a trademark controversy.  Their needs extend be-
yond the Lanham Act’s requirements to include the efficient and accu-
rate administration of trademark’s protections.35 Of course, efficiency 
may come at a cost. For example, additional “correct” results at the 
margin may not be worth the expense of more cases requiring a full 
trial on the merits.36 
 Once litigation is joined, the parties will generally want (assuming 
non-vexatious litigants) prompt disposal of the claims at issue. Here, 
too, rules that enable resolution on the pleadings or summary judg-
ment may come at the expense of accuracy. 
 These administrative interests are interwoven with the substance of 
trademark law. Consider the availability of trademark protection for 
                                                                                                                      
32 “Classic” fair use protects the right of competitors to use descriptive words to de-
scribe their own products even if someone is using the same word as a trademark. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). “Nominative” fair use is the use of a trademark to refer to the 
trademark holder. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–
08 (9th Cir. 1992). 
33 See infra notes 122–126 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 122–126 and accompanying text. 
35 See generally, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke 
L.J. 557 (1992); Jon O. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 
Yale L.J. 1643 (1985) (arguing that conceptions of fairness in the legal system should take 
account of efficiency as well as accuracy). 
Efficiency includes clarity of the law. Litigants also have an interest in the law’s stabil-
ity—that is, in durable precedents rather than case law that is easily distinguishable when 
convenient for a court. Litigants therefore benefit from rules and standards whose applica-
tion is predictable ex ante. This goal is discussed in greater detail in the next section. See 
infra notes 42–73 and accompanying text. 
36 See generally Bone, supra note 25, at 2101 (arguing that many trademark doctrines 
may be explained by considering enforcement costs, including the “administrative costs of 
adjudicating trademark lawsuits and the error costs of over- and under-enforcing trade-
mark rights”); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 49, 115 
(2008) (advocating “trademark fair use doctrines that reduce administrative costs while 
maintaining an acceptable margin of error”). 
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descriptive terms. Descriptive words may function as trademarks, but 
protecting descriptive terms may harm competition by removing useful 
words from the advertising marketplace. Trademark law strikes the bal-
ance by allowing descriptive marks if consumers recognize them as des-
ignating product source—in other words, if they have acquired “secon-
dary meaning.”37 
 The onus is on the party who claims the mark to establish that 
consumers make the necessary association.38 Allowing this showing 
promotes accuracy (the protection of marks that are performing a 
trademark function) at the expense of efficiency (the need to develop 
and test evidence that a court might accept as establishing secondary 
meaning).39 The factual showing can be avoided, however, if the mark-
holder registers with the Trademark Office and enough time passes for 
the registration to become incontestable.40 This option promotes cer-
tainty in mark status at the potential expense of accuracy (because of 
the prospect that the registration should never have been granted due 
to an absence of secondary meaning, though that cost is mitigated to 
the extent that the Trademark Office effectively reviews trademark reg-
istrations).41 
                                                                                                                      
 
37 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (allowing registration, with some exceptions, of marks 
that have “become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce”); Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 13 (1995) (providing that a nondistinctive mark may 
be valid if “as a result of its use, prospective purchasers have come to perceive it as a desig-
nation that identifies goods [or] services”). 
38 See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
39 Cf. Bone, supra note 25, at 2129–34 (arguing that allowing inherently distinctive 
marks to be protected without establishment of secondary meaning reduces enforcement 
costs). 
40 15 U.S.C.A. § 1065 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); id. § 1115(b) (establishing that incon-
testability of a registered mark is “conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark 
and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the 
registrant’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce”). There are also po-
tential efficiency gains from shifting the inquiry to an agency with experience and exper-
tise with trademark, as well as the ability to capture fees from trademark registrants. See 
generally id. § 1051 (setting registration requirements). 
41 Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985), ratified this trade-
off, holding that a trademark defendant could not challenge an incontestable mark as 
invalid due to descriptiveness. 
Similar tradeoffs exist with respect to classifying marks that are deemed inherently dis-
tinctive, and thus not requiring a showing of secondary meaning. These classifications are 
made by adverting to a spectrum of distinctiveness, described by Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9, 
in which fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are treated as inherently distinctive. See 
discussion infra note 98. Even if application of the spectrum may produce errors, it has 
been defended on the basis of the reduction of administrative costs on the whole. See, e.g., 
Bone, supra note 25 at 2133 (“[A] rule conclusively presuming secondary meaning for 
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C. Trademark as Part of the Legal System 
 Instead of looking narrowly at the needs of litigants, we might ap-
proach trademark at a higher level of generality. Our perspective could 
be indifferent to substantive trademark policy and concern itself in-
stead with broader issues of statutory interpretation and legal develop-
ment. This metric is problematic, resting as it does on conflicting un-
derlying assumptions about law.42 It is difficult to discuss the judicial 
role in developing trademark law without engaging in larger debates 
about the role of the courts. Any list of goals runs the risk of being little 
more than a declaration of loyalties in some larger (inconclusive) dis-
pute (e.g., realism versus formalism, textualism versus purposivism, 
                                                                                                                      
inherently distinctive marks saves substantial litigation costs and is likely to be correct most 
of the time. Moreover, when it is incorrect, the social costs of the resulting false positive 
errors should be small.”). 
Some have argued that the Abercrombie spectrum lacks empirical support. See Thomas 
R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn L. Christensen, An Empirical and Consumer Psychology Anal-
ysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 1033, 1099 (2009) (arguing that, in fact, 
“[d]escriptive words stand on equal footing with their suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful 
counterparts when it comes to consumer perception of their source indication, and there 
is no basis for any continuing distinction between [them]”); see id. at 1107–08 (arguing 
that the Abercrombie spectrum does not lower administrative costs). 
Assuming arguendo that this challenge is correct, it does not necessarily follow that 
courts should abandon the spectrum. Such a move would significantly alter the substance 
of trademark law and upend many settled understandings. See id. at 1108 (agreeing that 
lowering the bar to trademark protection would increase the number of applications for 
trademark registration). For courts to take this step instead of Congress would raise sig-
nificant issues of accountability and perhaps undermine the coherence of trademark law. 
These concerns are developed in the next subpart. 
42 For example, one’s position on the formalist/realist divide may affect views of proper 
judging. The definitions of these terms are often contested, so for current purposes, formal-
ism is defined as: 
A commitment to a set of ideas that more or less includes the following: 
1. The law consists (at least in part) of rules that are derived from the linguis-
tic meaning (or semantic content) of authoritative legal texts. 
2. Legal rules can be applied to particular facts. 
3. Some actions accord with meaningful legal rules; other actions do not. 
4. The standard for what constitutes following a rule (or not) can be publicly 
knowable and the focus of intersubjective agreement. 
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Formalism and Instrumentalism, Legal Theory 
Blog (Apr. 17, 2011, 10:38 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2011/04/legal-
theory-lexicon-formalism-instrumentalism.html. Realism refers to the view that the out-
comes of cases reaching appellate review are mostly explained by looking to nonlegal fac-
tors. Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of 
Law and Legal Theory 50, 52 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) 
(“In particular, all the Realists endorsed what we may call ‘the Core Claim’ of Realism: in 
deciding cases, judges respond primarily to the facts of the case, rather than to legal rules 
and reasons.”). 
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rules versus standards, etc.).43 There is also the risk that one’s substan-
tive commitments will dictate one’s chosen approach for moving be-
yond substantive issues.44 
 Perhaps more can be said. Partisans in these larger arguments of-
ten endorse similar goals even as they dispute the best means to achieve 
them. For example, both sides of the statutory interpretation debate on 
the propriety of using legislative history typically embrace the principle 
of legislative supremacy.45 The issue is in part over which method best 
minimizes the ability of unelected judges to enact their own prefer-
ences into law absent statutory authorization.46 Overlapping areas of 
agreement may soften the edges of other similar debates,47 or threaten 
the coherence of the divides.48 At the end of the day, we may share 
some underlying assumptions about the legal goods we want judges to 
                                                                                                                      
43 See Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 
Iowa L. Rev. 195, 224 (2010) (“[O]ne can say that contemporary positive law is an admix-
ture in which prescriptions, proscriptions, delegations, formalities, interpretive techniques, 
and reasoning modes (and much more) by turn mutate and precipitate in all sorts of ways 
in accordance with the interactive patterns of the formalism vs. realism disputes.”); id. at 
224–34 (discussing the debate in terms of rules versus standards, formalist versus realist 
elaboration of legal values, and textualism versus purposivism). 
44 Obviously this article is vulnerable to that charge. Section III.D.4 argues that atten-
tion to accountability concerns would promote, rather than hamper, trademark reform. See 
infra notes 245–260 and accompanying text. Further, the Conclusion unabashedly calls for 
greater attention to non-substantive trademark goals as a means of promoting substantive 
trademark reform. See infra notes 261–269. 
45 See infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
46 For example, Professor Schlag charts the debate between textualism and purposiv-
ism by listing arguments for either view as superior in constraining judges and providing 
legitimacy for judicial rulings, see Schlag, supra note 43, at 231–34. The chart also includes 
arguments regarding the goals of giving notice of the law and minimizing decision costs. 
Id. 
47 See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. 
Rev. 70, 75–76 (2006) (conceding that statutory purpose may be relevant to construction); 
Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 35 (2006) (argu-
ing that “[i]n scholarship and case law alike, what one finds is convergence of opinion” 
and claiming that although traditional purposivism “has largely disappeared and textualist 
rhetoric has made its way into mainstream judicial opinions[,] . . . even the most commit-
ted textualists have openly acknowledged that text can be ambiguous, that judges must 
read statutes in context, and that statutory purposes merit consideration in at least some 
cases.”). But see Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 117, 120–22 (2009) (arguing that the divide between textualism and other method-
ologies will persist as textualists abandon moderating influences). 
48 Schlag, supra note 43, at 235 (“explor[ing] the moves through which the cogency of 
the formalism vs. realism disputes disintegrates” and claiming that they cannot easily be 
resolved “by reference to normative and legal virtues such as efficiency, notice, cooperative 
harmony, rule of law, fairness, transaction cost reduction, human flourishing, and on and 
on”). 
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provide or at least some (largely if not universally) common concep-
tions of inappropriate practice.49 If so, we would then have meaningful 
things to say about the quality of the judicial administration of trade-
mark law independent of our views of underlying substantive disputes 
and without having to assume (or construct) extreme positions in lar-
ger controversies (e.g., statutory interpretation debates over the extent 
to which law is determinate and autonomous or indeterminate and 
contextual).50 Furthermore, those approaching interpretive questions 
from conflicting camps may share a tendency to moderate when ad-
dressing actual cases.51 
                                                                                                                      
49 Brian Tamanaha contends that these shared understandings have always been pre-
sent and that judges and scholars from the so-called formalist era shared many under-
standings about the law in common with the legal realists. See generally Brian Z. Ta-
manaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide (2010). He argues that judges have 
always engaged in a “balanced realism” that “conditions [a] skeptical awareness with the 
understanding that legal rules nonetheless work . . . and that judges render generally pre-
dictable decisions consistent with the law (the rule-bound aspect)” and that the “rule-
bound aspect of judging can function reliably notwithstanding the challenges presented by 
the skepticism-inducing aspect, although this is an achievement that must be earned, is 
never perfectly achieved, and is never guaranteed.” Id. at 6. But see Brian Leiter, Legal For-
malism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 Legal Theory 111 (2010) (arguing that bal-
anced realism is not a widely accepted position and that the formalist/realist division re-
mains relevant). 
50 Cf., e.g., Tamanaha, supra note 49, at 152 (“Because judicial politics scholars con-
stantly repeat the refrain that judging is political . . . it is hard to sound a genuine alarm 
when judges truly are deciding in a highly political fashion.”); id. at 152–55 (suggesting 
that judging may be increasingly politicized). 
51 For example, Justice Scalia famously advocates more formalist judicial practices, but 
he concedes that his opponents are not so different in their outcomes with respect to con-
stitutional interpretation: 
It is, I think, the fact that most originalists are faint-hearted and most nonori-
ginalists are moderate (that is, would not ascribe evolving content to such 
clear provisions as the requirement that the President be no less than thirty-
five years of age) which accounts for the fact that the sharp divergence be-
tween the two philosophies does not produce an equivalently sharp diver-
gence in judicial opinions. 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 862 (1989); see also Ri-
chard A. Posner, How Judges Think 49 (2008) (“Moderate legalists are matched by 
moderate pragmatists—pragmatists who believe that the institutional consequences of 
judicial decisions argue for a judicial approach heavily seasoned with respect for the lan-
guage of contracts, statutes, and precedents.”); Lawrence M. Solan, Response, Opportunistic 
Textualism, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 225, 232 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/ 
responses/04-2010/Solan.pdf (arguing that scholars of statutory interpretation agree that 
“that legislative primacy is an important goal, at least most of the time; just about everyone 
believes that one should begin with the text of the statute; and just about everyone uses 
contextual information, even if there is some disagreement about which contextual infor-
mation is appropriate”). 
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 What follows then is a list of desired, and somewhat overlapping, 
“system” goals that we might care about when evaluating trademark 
cases independent of our view of the substantive outcomes. Consistent 
with the (many) caveats above, it does not purport to be the account of 
system goals in trademark law, but rather an account of considerations 
relevant to evaluating how judges resolve trademark cases. 
 Accountability. Accountability concerns are never far from statutory 
interpretation debates, with general agreement that courts should not 
undermine the law as enacted by Congress (assuming no constitutional 
defects). The fight is over what it means to implement Congress’s will— 
for example, the extent to which evidence of meaning may be found 
outside statutory text or what constitutes an ambiguous text.52 The 
combatants still agree that Congress is composed of politically account-
able actors with constitutionally delegated authority to write statutes.53 
Courts, by contrast, struggle with accusations that they make law with-
out democratic accountability, prompting the search for boundaries to 
judicial discretion that might rebut the charge.54 The effort jibes with 
                                                                                                                      
 
52 Manning, supra note 47, at 110 (“Properly understood, textualism means that in re-
solving ambiguity, interpreters should give precedence to semantic context (evidence 
about the way reasonable people use words) rather than policy context (evidence about 
the way reasonable people would solve problems).”). But see Caleb Nelson, What Is Textual-
ism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 348 (2005) (“Many textualists do impose more restrictions than 
the typical intentionalist on the evidence of intent that they are willing to consider, but 
those restrictions need not reflect any fundamental disagreement about the goals of inter-
pretation.”); id. at 356 (“When the evidence that they are willing to consult persuades 
them that a statute contains such an error, textualist judges are perfectly willing to read the 
statute as saying what members of the enacting legislature apparently intended it to say.”); 
id. at 351 (“[S]omeone seeking to predict how textualist judges will diverge from inten-
tionalist judges is well-advised to start with the distinction between rules and standards.”). 
53 Both textualists and non-textualists argue that theirs is the methodology that honors 
the primacy of the legislative branch in setting policy. See Manning, supra note 47, at 91 (“For 
[purposivists in the legal process tradition], enforcing the overarching policy of a statute 
rather than the minutiae of its semantic detail better serves legislative supremacy while also 
promoting the independently valuable aims of policy coherence and adaptability of the law 
to unforeseen circumstances.”); id. at 92 (“Textualists . . . believe that the purposivist ap-
proach disregards the central place of legislative compromise . . . . [L]egislative supremacy is 
most meaningfully served by attributing to legislators the understanding that a reasonable 
person conversant with applicable conventions would attach to the enacted text in context.”). 
54 Compare Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 
1184 (1989) (arguing that textualism and originalism best provide restraining rules for 
judges), with Posner, supra note 51, at 252–53 (arguing that “[j]udges are less likely to be 
drunk with power if they realize they are exercising discretion than if they think they are 
just a transmission belt for decisions made elsewhere” and that legalists “smuggle their 
political preferences into their decisions but seek to deflect blame for any resulting cruel-
ties or absurdities by pleading that the law made them do it”). Posner’s call for candor 
does not mean, however, that he argues for judges to ignore legal sources. Posner, supra 
2011] The Judicial Role in Trademark Law 1295 
popular characterizations of the judicial role that echo the mechanical 
jurisprudence caricature of formalist judging.55 None of this rules out 
incremental judicial development of doctrine in the common law style, 
but it demands a bounded conception of judicial discretion. 
 Fidelity. The Lanham Act is the first place to look for boundaries. 
Because federal trademark law is now statutory, accountability consid-
erations compel courts to apply Lanham Act provisions over directly 
conflicting dictates from the common law or judicial intuition, limiting 
the potential for judge-made law.56 The ability of judges to engage in 
the common law development of trademark is therefore limited.57 This 
hardly leaves judges without substantive responsibilities. Statutes may 
leave gaps58 or delegate lawmaking authority to the courts.59 
 Judicial faithfulness to congressional delegation of authority, 
therefore, does not necessarily mean that courts refrain from engaging 
in “lawmaking” but rather that they honor the statute’s mix of delegat-
ing and non-delegating language.60 
 Transparency. A related concern is that the process and logic by 
which judges arrive at rulings be intelligible to (and predictable by) 
outside observers. Such transparency serves the rule of law criteria that 
                                                                                                                      
note 51, at 49 (noting that a pragmatic approach is “heavily seasoned with respect for the 
language of contracts, statutes, and precedents”). 
55 As the talk of umpires in recent Supreme Court confirmation hearings illustrates. 
Cf. Leiter, supra note 49, at 111–12 (distinguishing between sophisticated and vulgar for-
malism and noting that popular culture adheres to a formalist account of adjudication “as 
any observer of a Supreme Court confirmation hearing can attest (indeed, one might 
think the popular culture is the last preserve of Vulgar Formalism!)”). 
56 Cf. Schlag, supra note 43, at 230 (“[J]urists and legal commentators generally believe 
that, in terms of interpretive objects, the text is primus inter pares. Correctly or not, they 
generally understand themselves to be interpreting a text.”). 
57 See Grynberg, supra note 7, at 948–53. 
58 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 383, 421 (1964) (“[T]he Supreme Court, in the years since Erie, has been forging a 
new centripetal tool incalculably useful to our federal system. It has employed a variety of 
techniques . . . [including] the normal judicial filling of statutory interstices.”). 
59 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) 
(“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”); 
Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 187, 196–99 
(2004) (discussing delegating and micromanaging statutes). 
60 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 546–47 (1983) 
(“The judicial selection of means to pursue X displaces and directly overrides the legisla-
tive selection of ways to obtain X. It denies to legislatures the choice of creating or with-
holding gapfilling authority.”). 
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like cases will be treated alike and that regulated parties will have notice 
of what is expected of them.61 
 For many, this principle means that judges should minimize ad 
hoc decision making. This is not to say that we must favor rules over 
standards. But it does mean that the standards have content.62 
 Coherence. If specific legislative commands fail to bind judicial dis-
cretion, limits may be found in the larger legal framework in which a 
court operates.  Courts cannot apply trademark law, or any substantive 
body of law, without invoking other doctrines, like the law of evidence 
and civil procedure. More broadly, trademark may conflict with other 
areas of intellectual property law or constitutional commands like the 
First Amendment. If Congress fails to foresee and preempt these clash-
es, courts must police and clarify the boundaries when they start to 
blur.63 
 A similar concern, related to the pursuit of transparency, applies to 
maintaining trademark law’s internal coherence. Trademark’s multiple 
interests play out in a variety of implementing doctrines. Part of the 
judicial role is rationalizing this collection, consistent with the dictates 
of statutory commands, to make it internally consistent and compre-
hensible.64 Doing so helps produce predictable law by generating judi-
                                                                                                                      
 
61 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 39 (1964) (explaining that an effort 
to create a system of legal rules fails if rules are unavailable, incomprehensible, or too 
mutable to be relied upon by regulated parties); Scalia, supra note 54, at 1176 (“Statutes 
that are seen as establishing rules of inadequate clarity or precision are criticized, on that 
account, as undemocratic—and in the extreme unconstitutional—because they leave too 
much to be decided by persons other than the people’s representatives.”); cf., e.g., United 
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“A conviction fails to comport with due proc-
ess if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelli-
gence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encour-
ages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”). 
Insofar as the framing of the issue suggests a formalist tilt, it should be noted that the 
goal of achieving predictability is widely shared. Leiter, supra note 42, at 56 (“[T]he prob-
lem for . . . most of the Realists in the [majority] Sociological Wing, wasn’t that rules were 
pointless, but rather that the existing rules were pitched at a level of generality that bore 
no relation to the fact-specific ways in which courts actually decided cases.”). 
62 Cf. Scalia, supra note 54, at 1179 (“Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, ‘reckonabil-
ity,’ is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name. There are times when even a 
bad rule is better than no rule at all.”) (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law 
Tradition: Deciding Appeals 17 (1960)). 
63 See infra notes 120–139 and accompanying text. 
64 Thomas C. Grey, The New Formalism 2 (Stanford Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 4, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=200732, (describ-
ing formalists as “prefer[ing] to treat abstract categories like contract and tort as coherent 
structures of concepts and principles, rather than as bodies of sublegislation generated in 
the course of judicial dispute-resolution”); Scalia, supra note 54, at 1183 (“It is rare . . . that 
even the most vague and general text cannot be given some precise, principled content—
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cial rulings that are explicable as something more than a series of un-
connected ad hoc determinations.65 
 Effectiveness. We also want the law to work, for legislation to secure 
its intended benefits. To be sure, effectiveness takes us back to contest-
able questions of substance. It is therefore difficult to employ as a met-
ric for evaluating trademark decisions if one is indifferent to trade-
mark’s substantive controversies. 
 Securing the effectiveness of statutes, moreover, is not necessarily a 
consensus goal in interpretation debates. To the extent that textualists 
and non-textualists agree that we should consider the consequences of 
interpretive strategies, they dispute how best to promote effective laws. 
Some textualists argue that rigorous enforcement of a statute’s textual 
meaning (independent of considerations of purpose) will spur Con-
gress to enact clearer statutes.66 Their opponents view the claim as un-
realistic.67 
                                                                                                                      
 
and that is indeed the essence of the judicial craft.”). This goal may produce some tension 
with statutory text, but not inevitably, particularly given that current expositors of textual-
ism concede that text cannot be understood independently of the surrounding context. 
See Manning, supra note 47, at 79 (“In contrast with their ancestors in the ‘plain meaning’ 
school . . . modern textualists do not believe that it is possible to infer meaning from ‘with-
in the four corners’ of a statute. Rather, they assert that language is intelligible only by 
virtue of a community’s shared conventions for understanding words in context.”) (foot-
note omitted). 
65 See Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 581, 589 (1990). 
Without such a system of binding abstractions, it would be extraordinarily dif-
ficult for even a single judicial law-giver to be confident of consistency in his 
many ad hoc judgments; and it would be utterly impossible to operate a hier-
archical judicial system, in which many individual judges are supposed to 
produce ‘equal’ protection of the laws. 
Id; see also Fuller, supra note 61, at 39 (arguing that “a failure to achieve rules at all, so 
that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis” is the “most obvious” way that the 
“attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry” such that the result 
is “something that is not properly called a legal system at all”). 
66 See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (“What is of pa-
ramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear 
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of language it adopts.”). 
67 Congress may, in light of past practices, enact statutes on the assumption that courts 
will do what they can to effectuate the intent of Congress. Another problem is the diffi-
culty Congress faces in enacting text that would accommodate unforeseen contingencies 
in statutory application. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1509, 1551 (1998) (noting that Congress may not be “institutionally capable of 
responding to the new textualism by anticipating more issues and resolving them more 
clearly in statutes”). In addition, requiring Congress to draft rigorously precise language 
imposes a cost on the legislature that may frustrate its ability to enact statutes. Id. at 1550 
(“The new textualism would theoretically require more political and technical attention to 
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 A more fundamental dispute concerns how promoting a statute’s 
effectiveness comports with the judiciary’s constitutional role.68 Advo-
cates of looking beyond statutory text and context to determine statu-
tory meaning argue that courts should not try to thwart lawmaking by 
excluding pragmatic or policy considerations.69 Skeptics of such extra-
textual sources counter that a seemingly ineffective statute may be the 
product of a specific legislative compromise that had suboptimal statu-
tory implementation as its very object.70 This dispute quickly returns to 
questions of accountability. For one side, attempts to make a statute 
“work” arrogate the lawmaking function to the courts.71 For the other, 
purported restraint in interpretation takes advantage of the imperfec-
tions of language (insofar as drafters of legislation cannot foresee every 
contingency) to deprive a legislative coalition of the fruits of its vic-
                                                                                                                      
each bill than do traditional practices, and that phenomenon would diminish Congress’s 
ability to pass statutes.”). Indeed, Congress may deliberately craft vague statutes as a means 
of achieving legislative compromise, delegating implementation to the courts. Frank B. 
Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 43–45 (2008). This 
creates a conflicting accountability problem, albeit one directed to Congress rather than 
the courts. While similar delegations to administrative agencies created a body of law to 
address the resulting accountability concerns for the agency or the court reviewing it (e.g., 
the nondelegation doctrine or Chevron deference), similar accountability issues are present 
when courts, which are more insulated than agencies, are the delegate. Margaret H. Le-
mos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 405, 448–50 (2008). 
68 Compare John Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 673, 
675 (1997) (“[T]extualism functions to preserve the integrity of the legislative process by 
stripping congressional agents of the authority to resolve vague and ambiguous texts of 
Congress’s own making.”), with Molot, supra note 47, at 53 (“The creativity that aggressive 
textualism fosters in judges makes them look less like faithful agents of Congress and more 
like coequal partners. . . . [It] does not just elevate judges to the status of partners, as ag-
gressive purposivism did. It [turns] them into uncooperative, rather than cooperative, 
partners.”). 
69 See Molot, supra note 47, at 54 (“The more often judges exclude statutory purposes, 
and try to resolve (or eliminate) statutory ambiguity using textualist tools alone, the more 
likely it is that legislators’ purposes will be frustrated.”). 
70 Manning, supra note 47, at 96. 
[T]extualists believe that judicial adherence to semantic detail (when clear) is 
essential if one wishes legislators to be able to strike reliable bargains. . . . I be-
lieve that [this] position is easier to square with important features of both 
constitutionally and congressionally prescribed rules of legislative procedure 
that demonstrably give political minorities the right to block legislation or to 
condition their assent upon compromise. 
Id. 
71 See Manning, supra note 68, at 697 (“[A] court cannot treat [legislative history] as 
authoritative sources of statutory meaning without offending the bicameralism and pre-
sentment requirements prescribed by Article I, Section 7.”). 
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tory72 or to introduce needless irrationality to the law’s administration 
when a court is unsympathetic to the statute’s purpose.73 
 Debates about what makes a statute effective cannot be resolved 
without some consensus about what courts or legislators are trying to 
maximize. As a result, in trademark cases in which seller and consumer 
interests conflict (or in which the consumer interest is indeterminate), 
rulings might favor one view over another without necessarily surren-
dering a claim to serve the “effectiveness” of trademark law. 
D. Calibrating the Judicial Role 
 Once we know what we want from trademark law, we may think 
about the role of the judiciary in getting it. Heavy judicial involvement 
may be appropriate in some areas but not others. To take an obvious 
example, the Lanham Act creates a civil cause of action, so courts must 
make the factual determinations on which relief is based. Only Con-
gress could establish a federal cause of action in the first place.74 In be-
tween these extremes the division of labor is harder to perceive. The 
relative advantages of courts and legislatures in these gray areas are, 
however, well rehearsed. 
 Advantages of Adjudication. One of the common law’s virtues is said 
to be that courts decide only the cases before them. Focusing on the 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Molot, supra note 47, at 54 (“[I]f judges portray themselves as Congress’s 
schoolmaster, rather than its servant—trying to influence the manner in which legislators 
expend their limited legislative resources—at some point these judges will begin to inter-
pret statutes combatively, rather than charitably.”). 
73 Id. at 58 (“But isn’t it a faithful agent’s duty to assume the best, not the worst, of his 
principal? To be truly faithful to Congress, and to fulfill their role in the constitutional 
structure, shouldn’t judges respect Congress’s purposes and policies as well as the words 
Congress actually enacts into law?”). 
74 It was not always so clear that only Congress could create the cause of action. Ston-
eridge Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 164 (2008) (“Though 
the rule once may have been otherwise, it is settled that there is an implied cause of action 
only if the underlying statute can be interpreted to disclose the intent to create one.”) 
(citations omitted). This says nothing about whether a contributory infringement action 
may be created by the courts. Compare Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994) (rejecting aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act and stating “when Congress enacts a statute under which a 
person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s viola-
tion of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also 
sue aiders and abettors”), with Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 
(1982) (“[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a 
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to 
know is engaging in trademark infringement, [it] is contributorially responsible for any 
harm done as a result of the deceit.”). 
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particular allows rules to evolve flexibly, adapting to the specific factual 
contexts that summon them.75 Legislatively created rules (or sweeping 
judicial holdings) may prove overly broad and ill-suited for unantici-
pated circumstances.76 Legislatures also make drafting mistakes, using 
language thought to apply to a narrow set of circumstances but actually 
having wide applicability. Moreover, the limitations of language make 
ambiguity-free statutes impossible, even in the presence of high levels 
of drafting skill.77 
 Rules emerging from a common law process may adapt to chang-
ing times, depending on the strength of stare decisis.78 The existence 
of numerous veto points in the legislative process may make legislative 
error correction more difficult. The success of a legislative coalition in 
enacting a rule says nothing about the legislature’s ability to revise and 
correct its rules to adapt to unforeseen consequences of the precise 
wording of its handiwork. If courts are unable to modify legislative rules 
(or clean up poorly conceived or drafted provisions), statutes may be 
ineffective.79 Depending on the alignment of social interests, excluding 
courts from a corrective role may systematically empower some interest 
groups over others in the legislative process or exacerbate problems 
created by public choice dynamics. 
 Advantages of Legislation. We spend comparatively little time worry-
ing about the democratic legitimacy of legislation. In contrast, debates 
about judicial methodology grapple with the question of whether un-
elected federal judges set policy without accountability.80 Courts that 
advert to legislative history or policy in an effort to clarify statutory in-
tent therefore face charges of enacting into law rules that have not sur-
vived the constitutionally mandated gauntlet of passage in both houses 
                                                                                                                      
75 See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 Am. L. Rev. 1, 
1 (1870) (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and determines 
the principle afterwards.”). 
76 As Frederick Schauer summarizes, “[w]hen there is no actual dispute, so the argu-
ment goes, everything is speculation, and speculation that is not rooted in real world 
events is especially likely to be misguided.” Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 883, 892 (2006). 
77 Cross, supra note 67, at 43. 
78 Schauer, supra note 76, at 909 (“As long as precedent matters . . . there is an omni-
present possibility that any mistake will be systematically more powerful than any later 
attempts to correct it.”). 
79 Eskridge, supra note 67, at 1548–49 (“[T]he new textualist is less responsive to de-
mocratic desires than the faithful agent . . . [who] is a more cooperative partner in the 
enterprise of statutory interpretation and better reflects the Court’s role as a partner with 
Congress in the process of statutory law elaboration.”). 
80 See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
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of Congress and presentment to the President. The analogous charge is 
leveled against judges who purport to find clarity in ambiguous text. 
The problem is unavoidable, but Congress may at least mitigate it with 
clear statements of intent enacted into the statute itself. 
 A legislature is also said to be more capable of calibrating policies 
to address the needs of the citizenry as a whole.81 Judges are limited by 
the specific controversy of the parties before them, limiting their ability 
to balance broader interests.82 A legislature is free to consider any fact 
or information source. Courts are bound by the record before them and 
have comparative difficulty acting as a fact-seeking body.83 Moreover, the 
benefit of a court’s focus on the facts before it may be overstated. The 
primacy of the particular may unduly influence judicial decisions if the 
urgency of the facts at hand obscures the broader consequences of a 
requested holding. Resolving the case before the court creates binding 
precedent even when it is not fairly representative of future analogous 
situations.84 Thus the cliché that hard cases make bad law.85 
 It is reasonable to fear the distorting effect of particular facts in 
trademark law. First, many disputes are resolved via cease-and-desist let-
ters because lawyer-poor targets elect to avoid testing the strength of 
their defenses in a courtroom.86 Even the well-represented often elect 
                                                                                                                      
81 See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to the Problems of Evidence in the Administra-
tive Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402–03 (1942) (distinguishing legislative and adjudicative 
facts and noting that “[w]hen an agency wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is act-
ing legislatively, just as judges have created the common law through judicial legislation, 
and the facts which inform its legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated leg-
islative facts”). 
82 Cf. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982) (“By focusing on the factual situa-
tion before us, and similar cases necessary for development of a constitutional rule, we 
face ‘flesh-and-blood’ legal problems with data ‘relevant and adequate to an informed 
judgment.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
83 Indeed, merely considering arguments outside normal sources provokes contro-
versy. Compare, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“I disagree with Justice Scalia contention that foreign and international law have no place 
in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Over the course of nearly half a century, the 
Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assess-
ment of evolving standards of decency.”) (internal citation omitted), with id. at 622–28 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking use of foreign law). 
84 Schauer, supra note 76, at 894. 
85 Or easy ones. Cf., e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 640 n.* 
(1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Perhaps the adage about hard cases 
making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases.”). 
86 See generally Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, http://www.chillingeffects.org (last 
visited July 16, 2011) (collecting assertions of intellectual property claims). 
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to play it safe.87 When targets choose to push back, trademark plaintiffs 
may elect to pursue only the most promising cases. Second, trademark 
litigation is often characterized by an incomplete framing of the inter-
ests at stake. While plaintiffs are seen as vindicating the interests of con-
fused consumers, defendants are rarely seen as performing a similar 
function for the non-confused, even though these consumers often 
have an interest in the continuation of the defendant’s conduct.88 
Though the public choice literature describes how legislation may re-
flect an overrepresentation of special interests at the expense of the 
public at large,89 the legislative process does not formally restrict con-
sideration of third-party effects as do the rules of federal litigation. 
II. Trademark’s Non-Substantive Goals as Explanation 
 Identifying administration and system goals provides an alternative 
basis for evaluating developments in trademark doctrine. This Part sets 
forth examples of developments in trademark law that may be more 
easily described and justified by looking to trademark law’s administra-
tion and system goals than its substantive ones. These examples all go 
beyond basic judicial functions of statutory interpretation or factual 
adjudication of claims. They still stop short of giving courts general 
“common law” authority over federal trademark law. The discretion is 
highly bounded.90 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Kenneth Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 585, 589–91 (2008) (observing an increase in trademark case filings with a corre-
sponding decline in litigation activity and arguing discrepancy is best explained as “trade-
mark extortion,” an effort by mark holders to deter market competitors); infra note 231 
and accompanying text. 
88 For an extensive discussion, see generally Grynberg, supra note 17. 
89 This problem has drawn attention in intellectual property in particular. See, e.g., Jes-
sica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Or. L. Rev. 275, 280–81 
(1989) (describing the drafting of copyright statutes as a negotiation between industry 
interests). 
90 As noted above, supra note 54, one argument made by advocates of pragmatic statu-
tory interpretation is that making policy choices transparent favors restrained judging. The 
problem with this view in trademark arises when trademark’s substantive consumer- and 
seller-protection goals are at cross purposes. The ability to select between the two under-
mines the prospect that stating reasons will meaningfully advance predictability in the law. 
The problem is analogous to the one facing critics of the “propertization” of trademarks. 
Like it or not, and I do not, the principles used to promote the view that a trademark is 
akin to a piece of property may be found in trademark’s past. See Bone, supra note 17, at 
553 (“The notion that trademark law protects goodwill from appropriation is not a mod-
ern invention. . . . [B]road liability can result from a sincere, if misguided, attempt to apply 
general principles in a consistent way when those principles are framed in terms of good-
will.”). 
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A. Fact Finding and Its Law 
 Trademark’s fundamental inquiry, whether a likelihood of confu-
sion exists,91 invites judicial lawmaking in no small part because the 
term “likelihood of confusion” presents an interpretive problem.92 The 
inquiry would be problematic in any case. Suppose “likelihood of con-
fusion” were defined in an overly simplified way (and far more narrowly 
than current precedent) to mean no more than that a consumer is 
more likely than not to be confused about a product’s source at the 
point of sale (i.e., the moment the consumer is making the purchase 
decision). Even this simple definition demands a difficult factual in-
quiry from a judge or jury if the marketplace generates no direct evi-
dence of confusion. Whether confusion is nonetheless likely would de-
pend on a range of variables—the appearance of the parties’ marks, 
when the consumer perceives them, how the consumer perceives them, 
what other information is available to the consumer, and what, if any-
thing, the consumer retains from these encounters. The fact finder is 
supposed to evaluate these variables by reference to the experience of 
relevant consumers rather than her own.93 
 Every circuit approaches these variables in a structured manner, 
adopting a version of the multifactor likelihood-of-confusion test syn-
thesized by Judge Henry Friendly of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.94 These tests 
direct courts to consider mark similarity, market conditions, consumer 
sophistication, etc. The factors overlap considerably from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction, and converging practices largely swallow the varia-
ti .ons
                                                   
95 
                                                                   
 putting oneself in another's 
shoe ight look to someone who doesn't share one's 
own
t to circuit concluding that “judges 
rely
91 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (2006). 
92 See infra notes 217–231 and accompanying text. 
93 Cf. Laura A. Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 St. Louis U. L.J. 
781, 783 (2008) (noting that the “‘reasonable consumer’ tends to look a lot like judges in 
certain respects” in large part due “to the difficulty in truly
s, in thinking about how the world m
 physical and cognitive abilities”) (footnotes omitted). 
94 See 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
95 See 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 24:30–:43 (4th ed. 2009) (listing factors used by various circuits); Barton Beebe, An Em-
pirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581, 1586 
(2006) (detailing an empirical study of tests from circui
 upon a few factors or combinations of factors to make their decisions. The rest of the 
factors are at best redundant and at worst irrelevant.”). 
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 The use of multifactor tests produces any number of problems, in-
cluding the possibility that they compromise the accuracy of outcomes.96 
Their existence—if not their precise implementation—nonetheless re-
flects an area of necessary judicial shaping of trademark law. This is so 
even if it were true that ad hoc fact finding would better reflect an ideal 
survey of consumers. Many variables affect whether confusion is likely; 
litigants need to know which ones matter. Giving structure to the factual 
inquiry provides notice of the arguments and evidence necessary to liti-
atio
conflicting, stories that would make a strong trademark probative of 
g n and some basis for predicting the outcome, making easier the 
decision whether to proceed with litigation in the first instance.97 
 For example, the multifactor test considers mark strength, which 
encompasses both the extent to which a mark is likely to be seen as a 
trademark (inherent distinctiveness) and the extent to which the con-
suming public has come to associate the mark as performing a trade-
mark function (acquired distinctiveness).98 One can tell plausible, but 
both likely and unlikely consumer confusion.99 Litigants need to know 
                                                                                                                      
96 Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 
86 Tex. L. Rev. 507, 544–45 (2008) (describing problem of “verbal overshadowing” in the 
con
atter camp may study 
how
elig
 
text of trademark surveys and noting that “questions themselves may change a respon-
dent's answers by changing the way she thinks. Being asked to give reasons distorts reason-
ing, especially when the question has little meaning for the respondent . . . . Once an idea 
has been brought to a respondent's attention, he often thinks it relevant.”). 
97 This is true regardless of one’s preference for predominantly formalist or realist de-
scriptions of judicial behavior. Those emphasizing the former have precedents that set 
forth the tests and elaborate their proper application. Those in the l
 the factors are applied to particular sets of facts in practice to sharpen predictions of 
what courts do in trademark cases. Cf. Beebe, supra note 95, at 1646 (calling for “a new 
national multifactor test, one whose sole purpose should be to aid the judge in estimating 
the results of an ideal survey of the relevant consumer population”). 
98 In considering a word mark’s inherent distinctiveness, a court will classify the mark 
on a spectrum of distinctiveness. Marks that are arbitrary (e.g., APPLE computer) or fanci-
ful (e.g., KODAK cameras) are said to be strong marks because consumers are believed to 
perceive such terms as performing an inherent source-identifying function. Marks that are 
suggestive (e.g., COPPERTONE lotion) are also viewed as inherently distinctive (and thus 
ible for protection without secondary meaning), but are thought weaker for purposes 
of the multifactor test. Trademark law views descriptive marks (e.g., TASTY burgers) as 
weak and requiring the establishment of secondary meaning before they are eligible for 
protection, and their descriptive origin may still weigh against them in litigation. 
In addition to classifying marks, courts may measure a mark’s strength by considering 
the extent to which that mark actually is perceived by consumers as identifying a particular 
product or service. See Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2003) (ex-
plaining the role of inherent and acquired distinctiveness in the multifactor analysis). 
99 Id. at 148 (“Widespread consumer recognition of a mark previously used in com-
merce increases the likelihood that consumers will assume it identifies the previously fa-
miliar user, and therefore increases the likelihood of consumer confusion if the new user is 
in fact not related to the first.”). On the other hand, if a mark occupies a prominent place 
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which story a court buys. Whether the strength of the plaintiff’s mark is 
relevant in real life may matter less than having a consistent rule. Even 
if judges do no more than apply heuristics of questionable quality to 
the disposition of trademark claims,100 channeling the process through 
a consistent framework aids litigants in identifying and accommodating 
the factors that guide fact finding. 
 Providing structure to the factual inquiry through a multifactor 
test also limits the spillover uncertainties of ad hoc fact finding. A stable 
framework could aid appellate courts in catching outlier opinions (e.g., 
those caused by failing to consider a relevant factor), correcting errors 
while minimizing administration costs. And to the extent that the mul-
tifactor tests force consideration of relevant facts, they may enhance the 
accuracy of liability determinations (if the fact finder is forced to con-
sider a relevant aspect that might otherwise be overlooked).101 
 This is not to deny the costs of the multifactor test. No test can 
strip trademark litigation of the ambiguity of its underlying inquiry. 
Many decisions may be little more than gut reactions. Dressing them in 
the trappings of following precedent invites fact finders to miss the for-
est for the trees.102 Further, the justification for lawmaking in the con-
text of trademark’s factual inquiry is limited; it is not a rationale for 
courts to use a factual analysis to break new substantive ground or con-
                                                                                                                      
in public consciousness, the public may be alert to subtle variations between the senior 
and junior user’s marks. RP COLA may be more likely to be confused for RC COLA than 
KOKE with COKE. The same problem appears in the dilution context, where the non-
ntexts 
mak
pon a 
few 
 the outcome of the test, and tend in the process to stampede the rest of the fac-
tors
Circ articular factors in Internet cases). 
confusing use of similar marks is said to blur the distinctiveness of famous marks, although 
some data suggest that such uses actually enhance the distinctiveness of the mark. See Tushnet, 
supra note 96, at 537 (“In essence, exposure to near variants or uses in other co
es the trademark more familiar and thus more easily retrieved from memory.”). 
100 See Beebe, supra note 95, at 1586 (contending that “judges employ fast and frugal 
heuristics to short-circuit the multifactor test. Perhaps as an expression of their cognitive 
limitations, but more likely as an expression of their cognitive ingenuity, judges rely u
factors or combinations of factors to make their decisions.”) (footnote omitted). 
101 But see id. at 1600 (reporting that “in practice, a limited number of core factors de-
termine
”). 
102 See supra note 96. In a case before a jury, the parties face a black box, though most 
trademark cases that reach trial are resolved by a judge. Port, supra note 87, at 628–29 
(“[A]lthough the total number of cases that reach a trial on the merits continues to go 
down, the number of cases tried before a jury remains relatively constant at about one-
third after 1985.”); id. at 618. And the multifactor test, or its context-specific modifications, 
may shape jury instructions. See Internet Specialties West, Inc. v. Milon-DiGiorgio Enters., 
Inc., 559 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding jury instructions based on the Ninth 
uit’s multifactor test and the circuit’s emphasis on p
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ceal substantive lawmaking behind the guise of factual adjudication. 
This danger is discussed below.103 
 My claim is not that current incarnations of the likelihood-of-
confusion tests are ideal. Rather it is that while they may be of question-
able effectiveness in implementing trademark’s substantive goals, they 
are an example of judicial lawmaking that serves trademark’s system and 
(perhaps) administration goals. They are also inevitable. Congress is 
unlikely to codify a uniform approach to trademark adjudication (be-
yond that 
ch
e-
rm
made. Arguments may be made for or against these propositions, but 
the Lanham Act’s text provides no clear directive on the substance.108 
                                                                                                                     
 the occasional burden allocation104), and it is questionable 
su  an effort could plausibly provide the needed flexibility to antici-
pate the range of cases that drive the evolution of doctrine.105 
B. Policing the Line Between Delegated and Non-delegated Authority 
 The Lanham Act contains open provisions that effectively delegate 
authority to judges to make rules that cannot be derived from the text as 
a matter of logic.106 Spillover law from adjudicating likelihood of confu-
sion is one example.107 The standard’s substance is another, perhaps 
regrettable, one. Congress did not define when the consumer’s likeli-
hood of confusion is to be measured. Courts have therefore had to d
te ine whether confusion is measured solely at the point of sale or if 
confusion can also be actionable before or after a purchasing decision is 
 
103 See infra notes 165–199 and accompanying text. 
104 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2006) (providing that where a plaintiff is claiming 
protection of unregistered trade dress, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that 
the trade dress is not functional). 
105 In broadening the dilution liability standard to reach actions that cause a likelihood 
of dilution, Congress listed a range of “relevant” factors including similarity between the 
defendant’s and plaintiff’s mark, the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the exclusivity of the 
plaintiff’s use of the mark, the famous mark’s notoriety, a defendant’s intent to create an 
association between his mark and the famous mark, and any actual association between the 
two. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 1730, 1730–
32 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). At best these factors are incomplete. They 
consider, for example, the existence of an “association” between the marks, but the statutory 
definition of dilution by blurring is not any association, but rather an association that is likely 
to actually “impair[] the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” § 1125(c)(2)(B). Unsurpris-
ingly, Congress’s effort has not, in practice, brought clarity to dilution analysis. See infra notes 
195–197 and accompanying text. 
106 Leval, supra note 59, at 196–99 (distinguishing delegating and micromanaging stat-
utes and arguing that the Lanham Act is delegating). 
107 See supra notes 91–105 and accompanying text. 
108 This is to the detriment of accountability concerns. See infra notes 217–231 and ac-
companying text. 
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 Delegating authority to courts in some areas does not create a 
general common law of trademark, as the Lanham Act’s treatment of 
evidentiary burdens demonstrates.109 The “classic” fair use doctrine in 
trademark law provides that even if a descriptive word is trademarked 
(e.g., TASTY burgers), competitors in the marketplace have a right to 
use the word in its descriptive sense (e.g., “Try EAGLE burgers; they’re 
tasty!”). Although Congress codified the defense,110 some courts none-
theless required defendants invoking it to establish that their conduct 
did not create a likelihood of confusion. These holdings were inconsis-
tent with conventional statutory interpretation methods: Congress had 
codified classic fair use as a defense, which by its nature contemplates 
the possibility that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case but still 
lose. The structure of the statute places the burden of showing the exis-
tence of confusion on the plaintiff, without requiring the defendant to 
prove its absence. Applying this (conventional) reasoning, the Supreme 
our
elf,116 or accommodations to external bodies of law like 
the First Amendment.117 But Park ’N Fly forecloses the notion of judicial 
carte blanche. 
                                                                                                                     
C t unanimously rejected efforts to rewrite the scope of Congress’s 
delegation to the courts.111 
 This restrictive view cuts both ways, and reconciles seemingly con-
flicting precedents on the availability of defenses.112 Section 33(b) of the 
Lanham Act sets forth defenses to the infringement of incontestable 
marks.113 In Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., the Supreme Court 
refused to expand Congress’s list to include the claim that the mark was 
descriptive and thus should never have been registered in the first in-
stance.114 To have held otherwise would have nullified one of the bene-
fits of incontestable status that Congress had intended to grant. One 
could argue that courts may still recognize defenses that are part of 
trademark’s common law baseline,115 quasi-defenses rooted in the liabil-
ity standard its
 
109 The Lanham Act allocates some burdens directly. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) 
(providing that where a plaintiff is claiming protection of unregistered trade dress, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the trade dress is not functional). 
110 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
111 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 124 
(2004). 
112 On incontestability generally, see supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
113 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). 
114 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985). 
115 See infra notes 140–146 and accompanying text. 
116 Grynberg, supra note 7, at 963–69. 
117 See infra notes 122–126 and accompanying text. 
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C. Maintaining Coherence 
 Accountability concerns are never far behind when the judiciary 
has a lawmaking role, creating the need for checks to discretion.118 If 
not found in statutory text, they may be supplied as a byproduct of im-
plementing the system goal of maintaining the coherence of trademark 
law and adjacent and related doctrines. Trademark’s substantive goals, 
being contested, cannot always fulfill this role, particularly at trade-
mark’s frontiers. Like statutory text, sound policy may be indeterminate. 
Without a consensus on whether trademark’s consumer-protection or 
seller-protection rationales prevail in conflict and precisely how best to 
serve either goal, appeals to policy cannot predictably resolve dis-
putes.119 
1. Preserving External Commands 
 Like any body of law, trademark coexists with other doctrines that 
influence the course of adjudication (e.g., the law of evidence120 or re-
medies).121 
 Other doctrines have a more substantive effect. The First Amend-
ment, for example, is a potential trump to litigation. While the com-
mercial speech doctrine traditionally gives trademark plenty of lee-
way,122 some claims raise speech concerns, particularly when the claim 
                                                                                                                      
 
118 See Lemos, supra note 67, at 448–50; see also supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
119 Compare Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1174–75, 1181–82 
(9th Cir. 2010) (treating defendants’ conduct in a nominative fair use case as promoting 
market efficiency), with id. at 1186 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (“To the extent that the 
majority sees their activities as especially socially worthy and above reproach, I do not 
agree.”). 
120 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Plevan, Daubert’s Impact on Survey Experts in Lanham Act Litiga-
tion, 95 Trademark Rep. 596, 597 (2005) (“In general, it appears that the Daubert era has 
given Lanham Act litigators a greater opportunity to challenge an opponent’s survey evi-
dence in advance of a trial, particularly a jury trial.”). 
121 N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 
2008) (directing reconsideration of injunctive remedy in light of Supreme Court’s treat-
ment of patent injunctions in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). 
122 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) 
(asking whether a regulation of commercial speech directly advances a substantial gov-
ernment interest). In general, courts are reluctant to view applications of trademark law to 
commercial speech as raising First Amendment concerns. Cf. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks 
Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 973 (1993) (“Whatever first amendment rights you may 
have in calling the brew you make in your bathtub ‘Pepsi’ are easily outweighed by the 
buyer’s interest in not being fooled into buying it.”). Some commentators argue that 
courts have been too sanguine about the compatibility of trademark and free speech con-
cerns. See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 1095, 1101 (2003) (arguing that protecting descriptive trademarks is an unconstitu-
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is based on the depiction of a trademarked brand in art123 or commen-
tary.124 Courts accommodate the constitutional issue in a variety of 
ways. Some cases treat speech that could raise a claim of First Amend-
ment protection as simply non-confusing in the first instance.125 Others 
construct balancing tests to provide breathing space for expression.126 
These accommodations all leave fingerprints on trademark doctrine. 
 Several doctrines could play a greater role in trademark law than 
they do today. Some trademark claims present a theory of harm so te-
nuous that an injury-in-fact may not exist for Article III purposes.127 
Standing could be the basis for restraining more adventurous claims 
under the Lanham Act or, alternatively, interposing a materiality re-
quirement (which already exists in the law of false advertising) as a liti-
gation barrier.128 Similarly, the pleading revolution of Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly may lead courts to be more demanding 
when plaintiffs plead peripheral trademark claims.129 
                                                                                                                      
 
tional regulation of commercial speech); cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial 
Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737, 755 (2007) (“Taking modern First Amendment doc-
trine seriously would have significant effects on the Lanham Act, affecting everything from 
the standard of proof to the definition of what counts as misleading.”). Others think courts 
worry too much. See Leval, supra note 59, at 210 (arguing that overreaching trademark 
claims can be excluded without invoking the First Amendment). 
123 See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 
1996) (concerning a movie producer’s merchandising of puppet named “Spa’am”). 
124 See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1308–09 (N.D. Ga. 
2008) (addressing the use of “WALOCAUST” in reference to Wal-Mart). 
125 See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 263 
(4th Cir. 2007); Hormel, 73 F.3d at 505. 
126 See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999 (“[T]he [Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to 
artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the 
public interest in free expression.”). 
127 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (listing factors in estab-
lishing constitutional standing). Standing seems especially troublesome in the dilution 
context. The claim that activities that purportedly “blur” a famous mark’s strength actually 
lead to reduced consumer identification is debatable. At the very least, there is a plausible 
counter story that many purportedly blurring acts actually strengthen the targeted mark. 
See discussion supra note 99. Even then, the claim that the dilution leads to lost sales is 
dubious. Against this backdrop of uncertainty, however, Congress has amended the dilu-
tion statute to require that plaintiffs merely show a likelihood of dilution rather than ac-
tual dilution. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
128 Grynberg, supra note 7, at 963–66. 
129 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (requiring complaints to state facially 
“plausible” claims and stating that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged,” but that facts that are “merely consistent with” liability 
fall short (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007))); Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 557. Pleading a harm of likely dilution under this standard presents problems if 
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 These and other doctrines provide an entry point for further judi-
cial shaping of the trademark cause of action by importing and translat-
ing independent bodies of law. The translation carries checks to judi-
cial discretion because the accommodation of an independent doctrine 
brings with it the demands of that doctrine.130 
2. Preserving Trademark as a Distinct IP Regime 
 Because objects may embody differing kinds of IP (for example, a 
product logo may be both a trademark and a copyrighted design), the 
external source of law requiring accommodation may be another IP 
regime. Expansive claims under one regime may erode the boundary 
separating it from another, injecting unpredictability into both unless 
courts intervene. Baker v. Selden is the classic example.131 In rejecting a 
copyright claim grounded in the similarity between accounting forms, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the forms bore too close a corre-
spondence to the underlying accounting system. That system was pro-
tectable, if at all, under patent law, the IP regime designed to protect 
inventions. The failure to secure a patent could not be overcome by 
seeking analogous protections under copyright law.132 
 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. used the principle of 
maintaining good fences between IP neighbors to restrict trademark’s 
growth in.133 The Court unanimously turned aside a “reverse passing 
off” action based on the sale of a documentary that relied on out-of-
copyright footage (one of the plaintiffs had held the lapsed copyright 
in the footage).134 The decision was largely based on an interpretation 
of the meaning of the word “origin” in the Lanham Act, but it also in-
voked the need to maintain the respective integrity of copyright and 
                                                                                                                      
presented to a judge unwilling to accept the mechanics of dilution’s purported harm as a 
matter of faith. See discussion supra note 99. In practice, many judges do make this leap of 
faith. See infra notes 195–197 and accompanying text. 
130 Nor is the process described here necessarily one that curtails trademark’s scope. 
For instance, trademark’s secondary liability doctrines rest on the view that common law 
principles of secondary liability supplement the Lanham Act’s cause of action. Tiffany (NJ) 
Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Contributory trademark infringement is 
a judicially created doctrine that derives from the common law of torts.”); see also supra 
note 74. 
131 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
132 See id. at 102–03. 
133 539 U.S. 23 (2003). Justice Breyer did not participate. 
134 “‘Passing off’ (or palming off, as it is sometimes called) occurs when a producer mis-
represents his own goods or services as someone else’s. ‘Reverse passing off,’ as its name im-
plies, is the opposite: The producer misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as his 
own.” Id. at 27 n.1 (citations omitted). 
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trademark.135 If copyright allows the free copying of a public domain 
work, then permitting the functional equivalent of a copyright claim 
(i.e., prohibiting a work’s copying and distribution) under the guise of 
trademark law would interfere with copyright’s domain while expand-
ing trademark’s.136 
 Whatever one’s view of Dastar as substantive trademark law,137 its 
result jibes with trademark’s system and administration goals. A defen-
dant who ascertains that copyright protection does not apply to expres-
sive material should be able to use it expressively without fear of parallel 
trademark claims.138 Ensuring that an expansion of one doctrine at its 
peripheries (like the reverse passing off action at issue in Dastar) does 
not endanger core principles of another doctrine promotes predictabil-
ity.139 Because of the difficulty in foreseeing such conflicts, courts are 
uniquely positioned to resolve them. 
                                                                                                                      
135 Specifically, the Court concluded that “origin” means the physical source of a good 
and not the creator of its intellectual content. In other words, the COKE mark designates not 
the inventor of the soda’s formula, but rather the producer of the soda itself. See id. at 32. 
136 Id. at 34 (warning that plaintiffs’ claim would “create a species of mutant copyright 
law that limits the public’s federal right to copy and to use expired copyrights”); id. at 37 
(“[R]eading the phrase ‘origin of goods’ in the Lanham Act in accordance with the Act’s 
common-law-foundations (which were not designed to protect originality or creativity), 
and in light of the copyright and patent laws (which were), we conclude that the phrase 
refers to the producer of the tangible goods.”). 
137 Consumers benefit from Dastar’s holding because plaintiffs were unable to claim a 
monopoly privilege over the footage in a context in which confusion was unlikely. One 
could rejoin that the gain is offset by the prospect of an increased risk of consumer confu-
sion with regard to the authorial “origin” of the footage (to the extent that such confusion 
is important and incapable of redress by false advertising law). Cf. id. at 33 (“It could be 
argued, perhaps, that the reality of purchaser concern is different for what might be called 
a communicative product . . . . The purchaser of a novel is [primarily] interested . . . in the 
identity of the creator of the story it conveys (the author).”). 
138 Particularly because such claims are not subject to copyright’s built-in safeguards that 
are designed to allow the exploitation of expressive matter. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186, 219–20 (2003) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to retroactive copyright exten-
sion in part because of “built-in” accommodations to free speech like the idea/expression 
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine). 
139 In a similar vein, the Supreme Court held that the functional features of a product 
design are ineligible for trademark protection even if design alternatives exist for the fea-
ture. This holding stemmed, in part, from the need to ensure that inventions that had 
come off patent were freely available for copying (though the Court stopped short of hold-
ing that a once-patented invention could never obtain trade dress protection). See TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2000). For a general discussion of 
various channeling doctrines in trademark law, see Mark P. McKenna, What’s the Frequency 
Kenneth? Channeling Doctrines in Trademark Law, in 3 Intellectual Property and Infor-
mation Wealth 215 (Peter Yu ed., 2007). 
1312 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1283 
3. Promoting Trademark’s Intelligibility 
 Judges are also better positioned than Congress to preserve 
trademark law’s internal coherence by harmonizing the various aspects 
of trademark into a structure that is intelligible to those regulated by it. 
The effort is particularly important in trademark because the substan-
tial federal statute exists alongside a large body of preexisting common 
law, which continues to guide interpretation of the federal cause of ac-
tion. Harmonizing statutory and common law trademark may result in 
identifying underlying conceptual frameworks that shape and explain 
the greater whole. 
 At times, however, a concept perceived as fundamental to the un-
derstanding and operation of trademark law might not be codified 
adequately. Because these tensions reveal themselves in trademark’s 
application, their resolution is inevitably a judicial function. 
 The functionality doctrine is an example. One cannot claim the 
functioning mechanism of a device as trade dress.140 The exclusion 
promotes competition and prevents trademark from becoming a de fac-
to utility patent. Before 1998, applying the principle created a problem: 
the Lanham Act neither codified nor mentioned the doctrine, but insu-
lated “incontestable” marks from most challenges. The omission gave 
registrants an apparent end-run around the functionality doctrine if 
they could slip functional trade dresses by the Trademark Office. If the 
registrations became incontestable through the passage of time, their 
owners had a textual argument that their marks were immune from 
challenge even if they were functional because the statutory list of de-
fenses to an incontestable mark omitted functionality.141 
 Congress ultimately settled matters by amending the Lanham Act 
to clarify that functionality is both a bar to trademark protection and a 
defense to suit.142 In the meantime, judges faced two challenges. First, 
the statute’s incontestability provision clashed with trademark law’s long-
standing rule that functional matter could not be trademarked, as well 
                                                                                                                      
140 TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 30 (“Where the expired patent claimed the features in 
question, one who seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of 
showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely an or-
namental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device.”). 
141 Supreme Court precedent, moreover, suggested the plausibility of the argument. 
See supra note 114 and accompanying text. One circuit took this route. Shakespeare Co. v. 
Silstar Corp. of Am., 9 F.3d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that an incontestable mark 
may not be cancelled due to the mark’s functionality). 
142 Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, § 201, 112 Stat. 
3064, 3069–70 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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as the principle that trademark law is not about the protection of utili-
tarian design. Second, Congress’s omission of functionality from the 
Lanham Act created a tension between the common law and the statute 
that could not be resolved by the text. Omitting mention of functional-
ity might have meant that the statute excluded it by implication. Or the 
omission might mean that preexisting understandings controlled. 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit responded by 
adverting to the interpretive principle that courts not depart from the 
baseline established by the common law without a clear legislative di-
rective.143 The court noted the centrality of functionality to both tradi-
tional trademark doctrine and to its separation from patent.144 Con-
gress was unlikely to discard so basic a principle without mention.145 
Incontestability, though statutorily mandated, was not similarly funda-
mental.146 
                                                                                                                      
143 See Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 1999). 
As the Supreme Court has explained: 
Statutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption 
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when 
a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident. In such cases, Congress does not 
write upon a clean slate. In order to abrogate a common-law principle, the stat-
ute must speak directly to the question addressed by the common law. 
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
144 Wilhelm Pudenz, 177 F.3d at 1208 (“The functionality doctrine . . . eliminat[es] the 
possibility of a perpetual exclusive right to the utilitarian features of a product under 
trademark law, which would be impossible (as well as unconstitutional) under the Patent 
Act.”). 
145 During the time period at issue in the underlying litigation, the statute did not 
mention functionality at all. Congress did amend the statute to include a functionality 
defense and to incorporate the functionality principle into the federal trademark statute 
generally. See Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, § 201. Doing so bolstered the 
Eleventh Circuit’s confidence in its interpretation of prior law. Wilhelm Pudenz, 177 F.3d at 
1210–11. 
146 The court explained: 
Consequently, the mere fact that functionality is not enumerated in § 1115(b) 
is not sufficient to indicate congressional intent to eliminate the defense’s 
applicability to incontestable registrations. Indeed, given the absence of any 
explicit reference to the functionality doctrine, which is a judicially created 
concept that predates the Lanham Act, we should be hesitant to read the Act 
as limiting the doctrine’s reach. “The normal rule of statutory construction is 
that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judi-
cially created concept, it makes that intent specific.” 
Wilhelm Pudenz, 177 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)). 
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 Two points about the court’s decision should be kept in mind. 
First, whatever the policy merits,147 the court could not avoid selecting 
between competing substantive principles. Here, the reliance interest 
in a statutory right designed to give repose in trademarks yielded to an 
overarching trademark doctrine. Reversing the result would change 
nothing with respect to the role played by the court. The court would 
still have been defining trademark priorities. Until Congress returned 
to the issue, something had to give. 
 Second, even if one views the opinion as usurping statutory text (by 
failing to honor the then-omission of functionality from the Lanham 
Act), the court’s discretion was limited. The panel did not create a hith-
erto unseen exception to trademark protection; preexisting trademark 
law—of which functionality had long been a part—made the court’s 
effort one of rationalization, not invention. The opinion does not raise 
the accountability concerns implicated by common lawmaking. 
 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., which establishes that 
product design cannot be protected as trade dress without secondary 
meaning,148 is another precedent that may be easier to understand 
from the perspective of administration and system goals rather than 
trademark substance. To be sure, the opinion contains a number of 
pragmatic moves.149 It emphasizes the importance of avoiding anti-
competitive suits, specifically litigation brought by plaintiffs who allege 
that their product’s design functions as a trademark but whose true 
motive is to stifle competition. If competition is to be protected, courts 
need a way to filter out this class of claims before trial.150 The unani-
mous opinion looks all the more pragmatic in its empirically unsup-
ported assertion that product design is unlikely to stimulate source as-
sociations by consumers.  If true, then most product designs are not 
performing trademark functions, and a secondary meaning screen is 
sound policy.151 
                                                                                                                      
 
147 As noted above, the Fourth Circuit took a different approach. See Shakespeare Co., 9 
F.3d at 1099 (holding that an incontestable mark may not be cancelled due to the mark’s 
functionality). 
148 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000). 
149 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8 Marq. 
Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 187, 198 (2004) (classifying the rule in Wal-Mart as a “prudentially 
derived conclusion”). 
150 Wal-Mart 529 U.S. at 214 (noting benefit when “an anticompetitive strike suit” re-
ceives summary disposition); id. (“Competition is deterred, however, not merely by suc-
cessful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit.”); id. at 213–14 (discussing in ter-
rorem effect of uncertainty); id. at 215 (arguing that Court’s holding was supported by a 
balancing of utilities). 
151 Id. at 213. 
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 Wal-Mart is nonetheless as textualist as it can be, given that it inter-
prets some of the Lanham Act’s most open provisions. Section 43(a) 
allows a cause of action for unregistered trade dress, but provides no 
guidance with respect to the kind of trade dress that could be pro-
tected. Wal-Mart fills the gap not by ingenuity, but by looking to the sta-
tutory scheme governing trademark registration. These requirements 
run parallel to traditional rules at common law (though the common 
law was skeptical of trade dress protection).152 They establish the basic 
principle that secondary meaning is required for non-inherently dis-
tinctive marks, but they do not address whether product design is in-
herently distinctive.153 Only then does Wal-Mart answer the question in 
a manner designed to implement the principle that functional matter is 
not protectable.154 
 Seen in this light, Wal-Mart is a case about trademark law’s coher-
ence. Again, we see two trademark principles at cross purposes, albeit 
indirectly: distinctive matter should be protected; functional matter, 
excluded. The Wal-Mart Court could not avoid elevating one principle 
over the other. If product design could be inherently distinctive, more 
lawsuits would claim protection over functional matter. Requiring sec-
ondary meaning screens out many functional designs early on. This 
resolution comes at a cost, however, as some nonfunctional but inher-
ently distinctive designs might lose protection because the mark had yet 
to achieve secondary meaning in the marketplace.155 
                                                                                                                      
In the case of product design, as in the case of color, we think consumer pre-
disposition to equate the feature with the source does not exist. Consumers 
are aware of the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of 
product designs-such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin-is intended 
not to identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or 
more appealing. 
Id. 
152 The law of unfair competition was more forgiving. Norman F. Hesseltine, A Di-
gest of the Law of Trademarks and Unfair Trade 79, 83, 171, 173 (1906); see also infra 
note 158. 
153 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006). 
154 I make the textual case for Wal-Mart in greater detail in Grynberg, supra note 7, at 
941–45. 
155 Relatedly, Professor Bone explains Wal-Mart in terms of error costs. Bone, supra 
note 25, at 2160 (“In error cost terms, conclusively presuming source-identification for 
product design trade dress is likely to produce a high false positive error risk, and those 
false positives are likely to be more costly than for ordinary word marks.”). He notes that 
the emphasis on secondary meaning allows courts to screen claims from plaintiffs who lack 
direct evidence of such meaning. Id. at 2161 (“Indeed, one court has demanded such 
strong proof that it is unclear how a plaintiff can satisfy the burden without actually fur-
nishing direct evidence of secondary meaning.”). 
1316 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1283 
 How does the Wal-Mart solution stack up? Perhaps Wal-Mart priori-
tized the more fundamental principle to trademark law by elevating the 
policy that separates trademark from other federal intellectual property 
regimes. But that could be seen as a dodge, depending on the level of 
generality at which the competing principle is defined. It is arguable 
that product design’s ability to be inherently distinctive is not funda-
mental to trademark law, but the principle that inherently distinctive 
nonfunctional matter should be protectable has a much stronger 
claim.156 Describing Wal-Mart as a prioritization case leans on the fact 
that it does not foreclose protection for product design altogether, but 
only requires jumping the additional hoop of secondary meaning. 
 If the “trademark substance” issues were in rough equipoise, both 
in the abstract and as a matter of statutory priority, we might look in-
stead to trademark law’s non-substantive goals to explain the Supreme 
Court’s balance of principles. Wal-Mart does not preclude protection 
for product design. Instead, the case selects between two possible 
screens for protectable matter. Administration and system considera-
tions strongly favor Wal-Mart’s choice of a secondary meaning test for 
product design over an inherent distinctiveness inquiry. 
 Consider the alternatives. Secondary meaning is a familiar trade-
mark standard, one generating a substantial body of case law over dec-
ades.157 This test could be imported directly to evaluation of product 
design trade dress without significant modification. That is, the ques-
tion whether consumers have come to associate a product design with a 
single source is the same question asked of descriptive trademarks and 
trade dress in the traditional secondary meaning inquiry.158 
 In contrast, trademark law has not developed a similarly predict-
able means for determining whether trade dress is inherently distinc-
tive. Some courts try to impose the spectrum of distinctiveness used for 
classifying word marks. They try to apply adjectives developed for words 
to shapes, and consider whether a particular design is fanciful or de-
                                                                                                                      
156 One may rejoin that protecting product design was never central to trademark law. 
See supra note 152. 
157 Id. at 185 (“A sign, to be protected on the ground of unfair trade, must have first 
acquired a reputation, and have been imitated with fraudulent intent.”). 
158 This was the traditional approach to trade dress under the common law of unfair 
competition. 1 McCarthy, supra note 95, § 7:53 n.4 (“Under the older, traditional rule at 
common law, secondary meaning was a condition precedent to trade dress protection.”), 
§ 8:8 (same). The Supreme Court upset this understanding by ruling in Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), that trade dress could be inherently distinctive. 
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scriptive.159 Others try to tailor a test for determining whether trade 
dress is inherently distinctive and ask whether 
it was a “common” basic shape or design, whether it was 
unique or unusual in a particular field, whether it was a mere 
refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of 
ornamentation for a particular class of goods viewed by the 
public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods, or whether 
it was capable of creating a commercial impression distinct 
from the accompanying words.160 
 To a large extent this “test” does little more than restate the ques-
tion. How do we know if a design is “capable of creating a commercial 
impression distinct from the accompanying words?” By knowing 
whether it is distinctive. And we know that . . . how? 
 Approaching Wal-Mart’s choice without an opinion on the substan-
tive outcome suggests that the Court got it right. From an administra-
tion point of view, requiring a secondary meaning inquiry instead of 
grappling with inherent distinctiveness promotes efficiency in litigation 
if it leads to the early exclusion of claims that would have failed after a 
trial on the merits. It promotes accuracy if the Court was correct in its 
generalization that consumers generally do not think of product design 
as source identifiers, thus deterring claimants who might be encour-
aged to attempt litigation if they faced a less predictable screen govern-
ing mark eligibility. These gains are perhaps contestable because they 
depend on empirical assumptions. Less contestable are the predictabil-
ity gains to litigants. 
 From a system goals perspective, channeling the question of prod-
uct design protection into secondary meaning analysis clarifies trade-
mark law by limiting the ability of courts to engage in ad hoc judgments. 
Transparent judging requires standards comprehensible to practitioners 
and amenable to meaningful appellate review. A body of law dependant 
on an “I-know-it-when-I-see-it” standard fails this test.161 The choice is 
between a longstanding standard that could be applied to any mark and 
an evolving standard that to date enjoys only a rough linguistic correla-
                                                                                                                      
159 See generally 1 McCarthy, supra note 95, § 8:13. 
160 Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977) 
(footnotes omitted). 
161 This problem persists in borderline cases. See, e.g., Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made 
Simple, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 60, 69–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (treating liquor store interior dé-
cor as inherently distinctive packaging, not product design). 
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tion to its task and would apply to only a subset of marks.162 To be sure, 
plaintiffs may still come to court with product-design-as-trade-dress 
claims, but they must prove their mark’s threshold eligibility using stan-
dard methodologies.163 The court’s energies would be focused on a fact 
inquiry that it could plausibly resolve by adjudication. 
 None of this is to deny that Wal-Mart shaped trademark doctrine 
(as opposed to simply implementing clear choices made by Congress). 
Such shaping was inevitable in light of the many open questions with 
respect to infringement actions under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. The result, however, was an opinion that limited, rather than ex-
panded, the power of courts in future cases by narrowing the range of 
issues that would be subject to judicial discretion.164 
D. Summary 
 Judicial influence over trademark law can be exercised in a highly 
bounded way.  Courts may be operating in a limited sphere of authority 
(e.g., adjudicating facts), implementing policies focused on enhancing 
the law’s transparency (e.g., emphasizing standards that limit the po-
tential for ad hoc rulings), or striving for coherence (e.g., policing the 
line between separate IP regimes). These approaches ameliorate some 
of the accountability questions raised by heavy judicial involvement in 
developing trademark law, and they amount to something less than 
common law authority over trademark law. They also help explain what 
                                                                                                                      
162 See supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text. The secondary meaning inquiry 
presents its own difficulties and complications, of course. But it pushes them to a lower 
level of generality vis-à-vis trademark law. In the post-Wal-Mart world, the messiness comes 
after an easier categorization question (Is this product packaging or product design?). 
Had the case turned out differently, the initial categorization question would have been 
the messy one (Is this design inherently distinctive?). 
And by screening many claims out as an initial matter, Wal-Mart’s approach limits our 
need for a secondary inquiry of whether the product design in question is functional. 
While not as question-begging as the tests of inherent distinctiveness in product design, 
functionality suffers from its own ambiguities, particularly when applied to claims that 
aesthetic features are functional. In practice, courts are reluctant to engage the inquiry 
even when the features in question might meet what the Supreme Court has enunciated as 
the test for functional matter. See, e.g., Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 
457 F.3d 1062, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2006). 
163 To be sure, doing so may be resource intensive for litigants, placing pressure on the 
Court’s generalization that consumers are unlikely to see product design as serving a pri-
mary source-identifying function. 
164 And registered trade dress that had become incontestable would not be subject to a 
secondary meaning inquiry, allowing an administrative agency to shoulder some of the 
fact-finding questions. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
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may look to be contestable substantive choices as being an effort to 
promote trademark law’s non-substantive goals. 
III. Trademark’s Non-Substantive Goals as Critique 
 The previous examples, taken together, provide evidence of boun-
daries to judicial discretion and a demarcation separating the judici-
ary’s adjudicative function from Congress’s policymaking prerogative. 
They also represent situations where courts are acting in an area that 
Congress cannot (e.g., managing adjudication) or where courts may be 
said to act in partnership with Congress (e.g., harmonizing statutes with 
the preexisting common law or otherwise seeking system coherence). 
That is not to say that courts always act in a bounded manner, or that 
the Lanham Act provides clear marching orders. This Part describes 
failures in trademark’s legislative/judicial partnership from the per-
spective of trademark law’s system and administration goals. 
A. Blurring the Judicial Role 
 As described above, courts administer the likelihood-of-confusion 
inquiry in a manner that may promote clarity while minimizing ad hoc 
case law. First, applying a consistent structure to the inquiry gives gui-
deposts to future litigants. Second, interpreting open provisions of the 
Lanham Act to favor constructions that emphasize predictable imple-
mentation promotes policies consistent with trademark’s system and 
administration goals while retaining the potential to promote its sub-
stantive ones. 
 Although the various multifactor likelihood-of-confusion tests may 
bring order to adjudication, they risk defining the substance of trade-
mark rights under the guise of determining facts. Most courts consider, 
for example, whether the defendant acted in “good faith.”165 At best, 
the question has only a tangential relationship to the underlying in-
quiry of whether consumers are likely to be confused, but it plays an 
outsized role in litigation results.166 Evaluating good faith, moreover, 
invites judicial excursions into substantive lawmaking. Courts may look 
                                                                                                                      
165 See, e.g., Caliber Auto. Liquidators, Inc. v. Premier Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge, LLC, 605 
F.3d 931, 940 (11th Cir. 2010) (“When analyzing an alleged infringer’s intent, we must 
determine whether the defendant ‘adopted a plaintiff’s mark with the intention of deriv-
ing a benefit from the plaintiff’s business reputation.’”) (footnote omitted). 
166 Beebe, supra note 95, at 1628 (reporting that data “suggest that a finding of bad 
faith intent creates, if not in doctrine, then at least in practice, a nearly un-rebuttable pre-
sumption of a likelihood of confusion”). 
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at good faith in two ways: (1) Did the defendant intend to confuse con-
sumers?167 or (2) Did the defendant intend to benefit from the trade-
mark holder’s goodwill?168 The two questions may both be rooted in 
the history of trademark law,169 but they have very different substantive 
consequences. 
 The first question bears on a traditional trademark action that eva-
luates consumer confusion at the point of sale. The inquiry is plausibly 
evidentiary to the extent a defendant is likely to accomplish his pur-
pose. The second phrasing reaches further, for it encompasses situa-
tions in which the defendant’s intent is not necessarily contrary to con-
sumer interests. Comparative advertising’s traditional construct— “If 
you like X, you’ll love Y” —arguably depends on a mark’s goodwill even 
though it is used to expand the information available to consumers 
without giving rise to point-of-sale confusion.170 And trademark law is 
clear that such advertising does not, without more, give rise to a claim. 
Other trademark subdoctrines have been less cautious. They equate 
bad faith with goodwill appropriation and permit causes of action that 
might harm consumer interests generally, or privilege one class of con-
sumer at the expense of another.171 
 When a court equates bad faith with goodwill appropriation rather 
than consumer confusion, it smuggles legal interpretation of trade-
mark’s scope into fact adjudication. A framework devised to channel ad 
hoc factual determinations into an intelligible framework becomes in-
stead a vehicle for ad hoc lawmaking. The outcomes may or may not be 
substantively palatable,172 but they undermine accuracy (insofar as the 
legal inquiry takes the guise of a factual one) and the system goals of 
transparency and accountability. 
                                                                                                                      
167 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000) (treat-
ing intent to confuse as an important factor in a likelihood of confusion analysis). 
168 See Caliber Auto Liquidators, 605 F.3d at 940 (“[W]e must determine whether the de-
fendant ‘adopted a plaintiff’s mark with the intention of deriving a benefit from the plain-
tiff’s business reputation.”). 
169 See S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (“To 
protect trademarks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit . . . and to secure to the 
business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diver-
sion from those who have created them to those who have not.”). 
170 See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968). 
171 See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 465 (use of another party’s trademark in website meta-
tags “is significant evidence of intent to confuse and mislead”). See generally Grynberg, su-
pra note 17, at 95–109. 
172 Insofar as goodwill protection is a goal of trademark law. Grynberg, supra note 17, 
at 116–17 (arguing that goodwill protection only makes sense when it is in harmony with 
the promotion of consumer interests). 
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B. Fear of an Ad Hoc Planet 
 Judicial awareness that careless fact finding may lead to de facto 
lawmaking creates the risk of overcompensation. Courts might use a 
professed fear of substantively altering trademark law to resist adjudi-
cating particular fact claims. 
 McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC considered a 
trade dress claim by the seller of the artificial sweetener Splenda.173 
Splenda is the brand name for sucralose, which is available in generic 
formulations. Generic sucralose often appears on the market as a store 
brand (i.e., it is branded under the name of the supermarket in which 
it is sold). Splenda sued a distributor for multiple store brands, claim-
ing the defendant’s sweetener packets were confusingly similar to 
Splenda’s. The argument focused in part on the yellow color scheme 
used on both Splenda and the accused store brands.174 
 The district court found no likelihood of confusion and denied 
the requested preliminary injunction.175 The Third Circuit affirmed 
with respect to those packets that included a prominent store mark 
(e.g., SAFEWAY), but not for packets without a distinctive clarifying 
mark.176 For those packets, the trial court’s overall balancing of the 
multifactor test still favored the defendant even though the similarity-
of-the-marks factor weighed in the plaintiff’s favor.177 The panel con-
cluded, however, that the trial court erred in balancing factors, and it 
forbade the district court from revisiting the matter on remand in part 
because it feared that the district court was devising a new trademark 
defense to benefit store brands.178 
The danger in the District Court’s result is that producers of 
store-brand products will be held to a lower standard of in-
fringing behavior, that is, they effectively would acquire per se 
immunity as long as the store brand’s name or logo appears 
somewhere on the allegedly infringing package, even when 
                                                                                                                      
173 511 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 2007). 
174 Id. at 353–56. 
175 McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 512 F. Supp. 2d 217, 237 
(E.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d & remanded in part, 511 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2007). 
176 McNeil Nutritionals, 511 F.3d at 369. 
177 Id. at 363 n.4. 
178 Id. at 367 (“[T]here is no way the District Court could have ultimately balanced the 
Lapp factors against McNeil after weighing the first, second, seventh, eighth, and ninth 
Lapp factors in its favor.”). 
1322 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1283 
the name or logo is tiny. The Lanham Act does not support 
such a per se rule.179 
 Here, the panel substitutes a fact judgment under the guise of po-
licing the line between adjudication and legislation. The district court 
concluded that consumers expect to encounter store brands and will 
not be overly influenced by the presence of a similar color scheme be-
tween competing products.180 The Third Circuit effectively ruled that 
this is simply untrue, but dressed the ruling in the trappings of the 
proper exercise of the multifactor test. 
 What if the trial court was correct? This raises another issue with 
the reversal. Far from having avoided lawmaking, the opinion em-
braced an expanded view of trademark law that would permit the 
plaintiff not only to claim that consumers were likely to purchase a 
store brand sweetener (which was chemically identical to Splenda) by 
mistake, but also to base a claim on the prospect that consumers might 
be distracted by the similarities of the store brand but select it without 
being confused about whether it was actually Splenda.181 Allowing mul-
tiple providers to use the yellow color scheme for sucralose may benefit 
consumers by lowering search costs for those consumers who want su-
cralose without caring about which company provides it. By effectively 
ruling that such usage without a prominent counterbrand was confus-
ing as a matter of law, the Third Circuit resolved a contentious issue of 
trademark substance while pretending to avoid it, frustrating interests 
of accountability and transparency.182 
 A similar problem arises when courts attempt to shoehorn non-
traditional trademark claims into the multifactor analysis. The quest for 
                                                                                                                      
179 Id. at 367–68. 
180 Id. at 367. 
181 See id. at 358. This is the consequence of expansive initial interest confusion claims. 
Some precedent concerning such confusion emphasizes diversion of consumer attention 
without evaluating its duration or effect on a final purchasing decision. See, e.g., Brookfield 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999) (equating 
diversion caused by a misleading highway billboard with that of using trademarked terms 
to be listed in a search engine result). 
182 To be sure, this sort of casual empiricism works in favor of trademark defendants 
too. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. Compare Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2010) (upholding nominative fair use and downplay-
ing potential confusion because “[Internet consumers] skip from site to site, ready to hit 
the back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents. They fully expect to 
find some sites that aren’t what they imagine based on a glance at the domain name or 
search engine summary”), with id. at 1185 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (“I simply cannot 
concur in essentially factual statements whose provenance is our musings rather than the 
record and determinations by trier of fact.”). 
2011] The Judicial Role in Trademark Law 1323 
the veneer of formalism may unduly influence a contextual inquiry. 
The Third Circuit’s encounter with nominative fair use is a case in 
point.183 While electing to treat nominative use as a “true” defense 
(that is, allowing conduct to be excused even if it causes a likelihood of 
confusion), the panel required the initial inquiry to pass through the 
filter of the multifactor test.184 The court acknowledged, however, that 
the traditional test is a poor fit for the nominative fair use situation.185 
If a defendant is using the plaintiff’s mark to refer to the plaintiff, then 
factors like similarity of the marks become meaningless.186 
                                                                                                                     
 The court nonetheless refused to jettison the basic framework of 
its likelihood-of-confusion inquiry. Instead, the panel filtered out what 
it perceived as unhelpful factors, leaving a four-factor rump analysis as 
the focus.187 A streamlined test creates the risk that a plaintiff might 
make her case based on what would normally be a partial showing.188 It 
also leaves trial courts with little guidance on when to shift the burden 
to the defendant to establish the defense. The defense, moreover, in-
vokes the confusion issue in part by having as an element the question 
whether “the defendant’s conduct or language reflect the true and ac-
curate relationship between plaintiff and defendant’s products or ser-
 
183 See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 
In trademark law a “classic” fair use is one in which a trademarked term is used in its orig-
inal (i.e., non-trademark) sense to describe goods not belonging to the trademark owner. 
So if TASTY became a trademarked term for hamburgers, a competitor could still advertise 
its own burgers as being “tasty.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006). A nominative fair use, 
by contrast, uses the mark to refer to the mark holder. So a competitor to TASTY burgers 
might advertise, “TASTY burgers aren’t made with real meat!” See Cairns v. Franklin Mint 
Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150–52 (9th Cir. 2002). 
184 See Century 21, 425 F.3d at 222–28. 
185 See id. at 222. 
186 See id. at 224–25. 
187 The modified test would consider: 
(1) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and atten-
tion expected of consumers when making a purchase; (2) the length of time 
the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion; (3) 
the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; and (4) the evidence of ac-
tual confusion. 
Id. at 226–27. The court clarified that intent should be considered as intent to confuse, 
rather than intent to use the plaintiff’s mark. Id. at 227. The majority conceded that other 
factors could be employed in nominative use cases depending on the circumstances. Id. at 
225; see also id. at 239 n.18 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
188 Id. at 232 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Moreover, to the 
extent the majority places any burden on plaintiffs at all, it is so watered-down that plain-
tiffs might prove likely confusion on one Lapp factor alone. The majority’s bifurcated test 
is also judicially unmanageable because it requires courts to address identical factors on 
both sides of the equation.”). 
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vices.”189 With so vague a standard, the burden of proof matters, plac-
ing defendants at a disadvantage in the Third Circuit.190 
 Courts sometimes respond to specialized fact patterns by increas-
ing the generality of the confusion inquiry, thus avoiding the account-
ability issue at the potential expense of transparency in the fact finding 
process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s nominative 
fair use test, for example, replaces the multifactor test by asking 
“whether (1) the product was readily identifiable without use of the 
mark; (2) defendant used more of the mark than necessary; or (3) de-
fendant falsely suggested he was sponsored or endorsed by the trade-
mark holder.”191 The third factor is just a restatement of the likelihood-
of-confusion inquiry, albeit at a higher level of generality than that of-
fered by the multifactor test.192 So it is with efforts to accommodate ex-
pressive trademark uses,193 or address the legality of keyword advertis-
ing.194 Looking to trademark’s non-substantive goals may therefore not 
necessarily resolve contentious issues like those raised by nominative 
uses, but it does identify considerations that should be consciously en-
gaged. 
                                                                                                                      
189 Id. at 228. The dissent accordingly took the majority to task for creating a defense 
that effectively shifts the burden on the confusion inquiry to the defendant. Id. at 238 
(Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The majority’s approach whittles 
down this Court’s ten-factor Lapp test beyond recognition, permitting plaintiffs to show 
likely confusion on as little as one factor. The effect of this is to shift to defendant the bur-
den of negating confusion.”); id. at 239–40 (arguing that many retained factors have little 
clarifying ability as applied to a factual inquiry). Judge Fisher did agree, however, that a 
modified multifactor test was appropriate for a nominative use situation. Id. at 248–49 
(outlining a proposed modified test). 
190 By contrast, see Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1183–84 (9th Cir. 2010) (clarifying 
that the nominative fair use test leaves the burden with plaintiff). 
191 Id. at 1175–76 (internal quotation omitted). 
192 As others have noted as well. McGeveran, supra note 36, at 96. 
What actions by trademark users could carry such forbidden suggestions of 
sponsorship or endorsement? Why, those that consumers are likely to find 
confusing in this regard, of course. . . . [T]he nominative fair use doctrine 
degenerates into a substitute likelihood of confusion metric that offers even 
less guidance and predictability than the multifactor test. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
193 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (adopting balancing test 
that asks whether the use of a trademark as the title of an expressive work is artistically 
relevant to the underlying work and, if so, whether “the title explicitly misleads as to the 
source or the content of the work”). 
194 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1154 
(9th Cir. 2011) (remanding an initial interest confusion claim based on keyword advertis-
ing and directing consideration of “the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and 
the surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page”). 
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 Last, there are discouraging signs that courts might implement the 
new “likelihood-of-dilution” standard without proper regard to tradi-
tional litigation’s burden-of-proof allocations. Congress recently amend-
ed the federal dilution statute to provide that a plaintiff need not prove 
“actual” dilution, but only a likelihood that the defendant’s conduct will 
“blur” or “tarnish” the trademark in question.195 Even this inquiry is dif-
ficult, for many purportedly diluting activities may actually enhance a 
mark’s strength.196 Rather than put plaintiffs to their burden, several 
courts have elected instead to simplify the inquiry further by presuming 
dilution based on simpler proxies like mark similarity.197 
 These examples illustrate the dangers of pretending that adjudica-
tion is more transparent and rule-oriented than it is. The multifactor 
tests offer a potential virtue in forcing factual analysis to be visible. If 
the tools employed by the courts reflect the actual decision-making 
process—if they correspond to the heuristics used by a fact finder to 
determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists—they promote the 
stability of trademark law.198 But the adjudicative function is not served 
by false exercises in formalism. Summing favored factors in order to 
reach legal conclusions of likelihood of confusion or dilution inde-
                                                                                                                      
195 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
196 See discussion supra note 99. 
197 See, e.g., Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding summary judgment of likely dilution based on mark similarity and the 
strength of plaintiff’s mark). The Sixth Circuit used Congress’s intent to make life easier 
for dilution plaintiffs to shift the burden in tarnishment cases directly to defendants: 
It is important to note also that the Committee Report quoted above seeks to 
reduce the “burden” of evidentiary production on the trademark holder. The 
burden-of-proof problem, the developing case law, and the Restatement 
(Third) of Trademarks in § 25 (particularly subsection g) should now be in-
terpreted, we think, to create a kind of rebuttable presumption, or at least a 
very strong inference, that a new mark used to sell sex-related products is like-
ly to tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic association between 
the two. This res ipsa loquitur-like effect is not conclusive but places on the 
owner of the new mark the burden of coming forward with evidence that 
there is no likelihood or probability of tarnishment. The evidence could be in 
the form of expert testimony or surveys or polls or customer testimony. 
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010). But see id. at 395 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiff presented no probative evidence of likely 
tarnishment and that “the majority sanctions an almost non-existent evidentiary standard 
and, in the process, essentially eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff provide some 
semblance of proof”). 
198 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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pendent of the consumer experience allows judges to engage in stealth 
lawmaking.199 
C. Who Updates Trademark Law and How? 
 Courts must interpret the Lanham Act in light of changing prac-
tices and technologies. For example, the Internet’s global reach may 
lead courts to recognize broader geographic rights for unregistered 
marks.200 In many respects, this is merely adjudication that takes ac-
count of evolving factual circumstances. Trademarks once had little 
meaning outside their geographic market. The rise of mass media 
changed that, but that fact does not require a significant change to 
doctrine.201 
 Changing contexts create the risk that accommodation may be a 
pretext for altering trademark’s traditional scope.202 The Ninth Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                      
 
199 This view is supported by Professor Beebe’s analysis of the importance of the good 
faith factor in judicial application of the multifactor tests. Beebe, supra note 95, at 1608, 
1628–29. On the possibility of “moral” heuristics as guiding trademark litigation, see 
Grynberg, supra note 17, at 69–72. 
200 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 101 (1918) (holding that 
priority is irrelevant where users of identical marks operate in good faith in geographically 
remote markets). See generally 5 McCarthy, supra note 95, § 26:1–:30 (discussing common 
law use rights). 
201 That is to say, a strong Internet presence may lead to fame for the mark outside its 
brick-and-mortar market as a matter of fact, justifying priority for the user under the terms 
of traditional doctrine. This is not a far cry from existing precedent applying common law 
geographic rights. See Stork Restaurant v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 358 (9th Cir. 1948). 
In these days of chain restaurants, one would not have to be uncommonly naive 
to assume that even a “humble” cafe at Turk and Hyde Streets, San Francisco, 
might be an unpretentious branch of a glittering New York night spot. A branch 
unit is usually less elaborate and impressive than the “mother house.” 
Id. 
One of the benefits of registering a mark, of course, is obtaining nationwide priority 
irrespective of common law doctrine. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (2006) (providing that mark regis-
tration “shall be constructive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership thereof”). Here, 
too, changing times may lead to doctrinal alterations. Under the traditional “Dawn Donut 
rule,” the holder of a registered mark may not evict a junior user from a local market until 
the senior user is likely to enter the junior user’s market. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food 
Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364–65 (2d Cir. 1959). Some courts now question the rule’s 
wisdom in light of the effect of Internet marketing. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. CarMax, 
Inc., 165 F.3d 1047, 1057 (6th Cir. 1999) ( Jones, J., concurring) (noting that the opinion 
rejects the Dawn Donut rule and observing that a more mobile society and “recent techno-
logical innovations such as the Internet [that] increasingly deconstruct[] geographical 
barriers for marketing purposes” suggest that the rule “has outlived its usefulness”). 
202 Some argue that courts should be able to update the substance of statutes as they 
update adjudicative practice. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 367 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, 
J., dissenting) (observing potential benefit if “in certain circumstances, courts were per-
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early effort to adapt its likelihood-of-confusion standard to the Internet 
is a good example. One panel determined that the low cost of navigat-
ing online justified weakening the threshold for finding likelihood of 
confusion. It reasoned that the number of consumers who experience 
confusion due to inattention will increase because “[n]avigating 
amongst web sites involves practically no effort whatsoever, and argu-
ments that Web users exercise a great deal of care before clicking on 
hyperlinks are unconvincing.”203 This adjudicative conclusion was pre-
mature if not flat-out mistaken.204 It also had a substantive effect on the 
law insofar as it made confusion findings more likely in a context in 
which such confusion was less likely to be material to consumers (insofar 
as the ease of back-clicking reduces the impact of any confusion upon 
consumer search costs). The court’s reasoning paralleled the logic of 
contemporaneous cases that expanded the initial interest confusion 
doctrine in applying it to the Internet.205 
 The “merchandising” right is an example from the brick-and-
mortar world. The modern value of trademarks extends beyond their 
use as a brand to encompass value as a product in and of itself.206 The 
Boston Red Sox “B” logo has value when attached to a baseball cap be-
cause people want to buy Boston Red Sox baseball caps (not caps made 
by the Boston Red Sox). The maturation of merchandising markets 
raised the question whether courts would permit markholders to use 
                                                                                                                      
mitted to read the law according to what they perceived to be the will of the current Con-
gress, rather than that of a long-gone-by one” but agreeing that “whatever the merits of 
such an arrangement in the abstract, it is simply not a part of our legal system”). 
203 GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000). The court 
concluded that “[i]n the context of the Web in particular, the three most important Sleek-
craft factors are (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods or services, 
and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel.” Id. at 1205 (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
204 Cf. Toyota Motor Sales, 610 F.3d at 1179 (“[Internet consumers] skip from site to site, 
ready to hit the back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents. They fully 
expect to find some sites that aren’t what they imagine based on a glance at the domain 
name or search engine summary.”); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 320 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (“[O]n the information superhighway, . . . [w]ith one click of the mouse and a few 
seconds delay, a viewer can return to the search engine’s results and resume searching for 
the original website.”). 
205 See generally Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, Con-
sumer Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 Seattle Univ. L. Rev. 97 (2004). 
206 This created a problem for would-be merchandisers who had a history of not trying 
to control the use of their marks. See Univ. Book Store v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 33 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1394 (T.T.A.B. 1994) (rejecting abandonment arguments of registration 
opponents of WISCONSIN BADGER word mark and “Bucky Badger” logo). 
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the Lanham Act to capture and control them.207 At the substantive lev-
el, the choice appeared to pit seller and consumer interests against one 
another.208 Giving trademark owners control of merchandising markets 
allows the extraction of monopoly rents from consumers. On the other 
hand, trademark holders could argue that such rents will incentivize 
the creation of desirable marks, although incentive stories of this sort 
are outside the traditional trademark story.209 Markholders also appeal 
to theories of desert, contending that they are the ones who imbued 
the mark with value (potentially ignoring the role played by the fan 
purchasers).210 
 Regardless of the substantive merits of a merchandising right, es-
tablishing it required an update to trademark law. Traditional doctrine 
focuses on a mark’s source-identifying function, and the pre-1988 Lan-
ham Act did not provide obvious openings for a merchandising right, 
especially for unregistered marks.211 Rather than wait for Congress to 
amend the statute, courts conformed the trademark cause of action to 
a contestable view of what it should protect, shoehorning a new defini-
tion of “confusion” to confer a merchandising monopoly.212 
 Trademark adjudication may need to account for the particular 
challenges of the online world or changed business practices. But a fine 
                                                                                                                      
207 Copyright law may not work if the logo in question is insufficiently original. See 37 
C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2010) (excluding from copyright registration “[w]ords and short phras-
es such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typo-
graphic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents”); 
§ 202.1(e) (excluding “typeface as typeface”). 
208 See Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (acknowledging that merchandising claim “tilt[s] the trademark laws from the 
purpose of protecting the public to the protection of the business interests of plaintiffs”). 
209 See infra notes 246–252 and accompanying text. 
210 See, e.g., Boston Prof’l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1011 (“[T]he major commercial value of the 
emblems is derived from the efforts of plaintiffs.”). 
211 Today, there is at least a colorable claim that post- 1988 amendment section 43(a)’s 
reference to a mark holder’s “approval” or “sponsorship” creates the basis for a merchan-
dising claim. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). The argument relies in part on circular reason-
ing. Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 Yale L.J. 1661, 1668 (1999) (“If trademark 
owners win enough high-profile cases or brag loudly enough about licensing revenues 
from ornamental use, consumers will naturally think that the products they see must be 
licensed, which in turn will help insure that a license is indeed required.”). 
212 See Boston Prof’l Hockey , 510 F.2d at 1012 (“The confusion or deceit requirement is met 
by the fact that the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the 
public knowing that the public would identify them as being the teams’ trademarks.”); Stacey 
L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 Emo-
ry L.J. 461, 472–78 (2005) (discussing cases addressing merchandising right theory). Again, 
this move (while still problematic) is arguably more supportable under today’s statutory lan-
guage. See discussion supra note 211. 
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line separates adapting adjudication practices to accommodate chang-
ing facts from updating substantive law to accommodate changing 
business models.213 Finding and respecting the line is harder when the 
statute leaves so much up for grabs, a fault that rests with Congress. 
D. Legislative Abdication 
 Trademark’s system goals provide a perspective for critiquing the 
Lanham Act itself. Although the statute’s legislative history welcomes 
the common law development of trademark,214 responding to the invi-
tation creates significant accountability issues. Recent Supreme Court 
trademark precedents, moreover, balk at placing much weight on legis-
lative history,215 and the Lanham Act is not a sufficiently delegating sta-
tute for general common lawmaking.216 Although the question of 
whether courts are coloring within their lines is meaningful, we should 
also ask if Congress has provided visible lines. If not, courts should be 
more circumspect with trademark’s cause of action until Congress 
catches up. 
                                                                                                                      
213 Cf. Hayden, 449 F.3d at 367 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (although “it might be a good 
idea if . . . courts were permitted to read the law according to what they perceived to be 
the will of the current Congress, rather than that of a long-gone-by one” that view “is sim-
ply not a part of our legal system”). 
214 S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603 (“[The 
bill] revises Section 43(a) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1125(a)) to codify the interpretation it has 
been given by the courts. Because Section 43(a) of the Act fills an important gap in federal 
unfair competition law, the committee expects the courts to continue to interpret the sec-
tion.”); see also Dinwoodie, supra note 10, at 333 (“[B]oth Congress and the Supreme Court 
appear content that the development of trademark and unfair competition law in the 
United States remain heavily dependent on common law law making by the courts.”). 
215 Grynberg, supra note 7, at 933–45. 
216 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052 (establishing registration requirements), 1067 (provid-
ing for registration’s effect on priority), 1114 (delineating secondary liability for certain 
contexts), 1115 (explaining the effect of registration on assessing right to use mark, de-
fenses to incontestable marks), 1125(d) (establishing “cyberpiracy” rules), with § 1 (Sher-
man Act) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal.”). One could argue that the core Lanham Act liability provisions are 
similarly open, but the Supreme Court has declined to view them as delegating similar 
power. Compare State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“[T]he general presumption 
that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sher-
man Act in light of the accepted view that Congress ‘expected the courts to give shape to 
the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.’”) (quoting Nat’l Soc. of 
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)), with Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003) (“[B]ecause of its inherently limited word-
ing, § 43(a) can never be a federal ‘codification’ of the overall law of ‘unfair competition,’ 
but can apply only to certain unfair trade practices prohibited by its text.”) (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotations omitted). See also infra notes 240–244 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Inkblot Standard 
 The Lanham Act’s liability provision is vacuous. The likelihood-of-
confusion standard is undefined in its temporal, quantitative, and qua-
litative dimensions. These substantive gaps invite extensive judicial 
lawmaking and its attendant issues. 
 Temporal. Section 32 of the Lanham Act initially called for liability 
when use of a registered mark created a likelihood of confusion of 
“purchasers,” implying a focus on the point of sale.217 Congress re-
moved the purchaser language in 1962, suggesting to some courts an 
intent to open the door to confusion claims arising before or after the 
sale transaction.218 Not all courts agree,219 but the change gave cover to 
extensions of the trademark cause of action beyond traditional under-
standings. Congress did nothing to correct or confirm the interpreta-
tions in revising the statute in 1988.220 
 Quantitative. The likelihood-of-confusion standard does not specify 
the degree of likely confusion necessary to create liability. Taken to the 
extreme, policing confusion might require ruthlessly ferreting out any 
act that could foreseeably cause confusion to anyone within the Lan-
ham Act’s jurisdictional scope. But that would be nonsense. We live in a 
world of imperfect capacities for attention and high demands on that 
attention. Just about any trademark use is likely to confuse someone, 
somewhere, no matter how dissimilar the objects of comparison.221 
                                                                                                                      
217 Lanham Act § 32, 60 Stat. at 437 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006)). 
218 Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat. 769, 773 (codified as amended 
15 U.S.C. § 1114). For an example of broadening the temporal scope of the cause of ac-
tion, see Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the view that Congress’s amendment of the Lanham Act in 
1962 expanded trademark protection to include instances in which a mark creates initial 
interest confusion.”). 
219 Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“[W]e do not construe this deletion to suggest, much less compel, that purchaser confu-
sion is no longer the primary focus of the inquiry.”). One view of the amendment was that 
it was simply designed to clarify that the confused consumers need not have actually pur-
chased the product in question. U.S. Trademark Ass’n Trademark Review Comm’n, Report 
and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 Trademark Rep. 375, 378 
(1987). 
220 See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935. 
221 See S.S. Kresge Co. v. United Factory Outlet, Inc., 598 F.2d 694, 697–98 (1st Cir. 
1979) (downplaying survey results that showed that 7.2 percent of respondents believed 
that THE MART and K MART had common ownership in light of the fact “that 5.7% of 
the same people reached the same conclusion as to ‘The Mart’ and King’s Department 
Store, which are clearly unrelated. This led the expert who conducted the poll to conclude 
that ‘similar sounding names do not add to the confusion that is generally present for all 
stores’”). 
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Courts know this. They respond by invoking traditional legal under-
standings to ignore cases of negligible confusion222 or by filtering out 
background noise when considering survey evidence.223 There still re-
mains the problem of determining just how likely confusion must be 
and, in the case of survey evidence, just how much confusion in an arti-
ficial setting of test questions is needed to suggest likely confusion in 
the real world. Perhaps this inquiry is so inherently amorphous that we 
can do little better than delegate to courts the responsibility of con-
structing fact-finding frameworks. The resulting uncertainties are com-
pounded, however, by the standard’s other ambiguities. 
 Qualitative. The Lanham Act assumes Rorschach qualities with re-
spect to the subject of consumer confusion. The cause of action for reg-
istered marks provides no textual guidance regarding the nature of the 
necessary consumer confusion.224 Section 43(a), which reaches unreg-
istered marks, is little better. It targets likelihood of confusion “as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of [defendant’s] goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person.”225 “Approval” encompasses a 
wide range of possible meanings, from standing behind the quality of a 
product to giving permission for the trademark use in question.226 
 We might blame the courts for the resulting case law.227 Judges 
could have interpreted the statute more in keeping with traditional un-
derstandings and left to Congress the decision to expand trademark’s 
scope. We might also argue that this open text should be restricted to 
the kind of confusion that would be material to a purchasing decision. 
                                                                                                                      
222 Courts invoke the venerable principle of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not 
concern itself with trifles). See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 
103 F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[A]n isolated instance of confusion does not prove 
probable confusion. To the contrary, the law has long demanded a showing that the alleg-
edly infringing conduct carries with it a likelihood of confounding an appreciable number 
of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care.”); Witco Chem. Co. v. Whit-
field Chem. Co., 418 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“We are not concerned with mere 
theoretical possibilities of confusion, deception, or mistake or with de minimis situations 
but with the practicalities of the commercial world, with which the trademark laws deal.”). 
223 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
224 Section 32 of the Lanham Act provides liability for a use of a copy or imitation of a 
registered mark where “such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006). 
225 Id. § 1125. 
226 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775 (8th Cir. 1994); 
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding infringement 
based on a survey indicating ten percent of respondents believed trademark owner “goes 
along” with defendant’s use). 
227 See, e.g., Grynberg, supra note 7, at 903–13; supra notes 206–212 and accompanying 
text. 
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This gloss on the cause of action would harmonize it with traditional 
understandings of trademark and legal harm more generally.228 
Though a restrictive reading may promote trademark’s coherence, the 
current statutory text is amenable to broader constructions as well, and 
they seem to have been Congress’s intent.229 
 While I would argue that the breadth of the likelihood-of-confusion 
standard as interpreted by the courts is unwise as a matter of trademark 
substance, that position is contestable as a policy prescription. Less con-
testable are the problems created by the standard’s lack of textual clar-
ity.230 Because so much is delegated to the courts, would-be litigants 
have difficulty predicting the potential scope of the action—to say noth-
ing of the actual outcome of litigation. Threats to litigate matters that 
are outside traditional trademark concerns therefore have powerful in 
terrorem effects.231 Whatever benefits are achieved by the current state of 
affairs, they come at the expense of trademark’s administration and sys-
tem goals. 
                                                                                                                     
2. Mind the Gaps 
 As discussed above, the Lanham Act complicates interpretation 
because it incompletely codifies trademark common law.232 Courts 
 
228 Grynberg, supra note 7, at 963–66. 
229 See S. Rep. No. 100-515, at 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603. 
230 Most notably, the absence in the statute of any language directing courts to focus 
on confusion that might: (a) cause actual harm to consumers, (b) concern a matter that 
would be material to a purchasing decision, or (c) cause harm that does not carry coun-
tervailing benefits for non-confused consumers. 
231 Trademark owners often object, for example, to the unauthorized depiction of 
their marks in films. These claims may not succeed. Compare, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt 
Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting effort to enjoin filmed de-
piction of plaintiff’s equipment in fictional film plot), with Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New 
Line Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727, 735 (D. Minn. 1998) (enjoining use of “Dairy 
Queens” as a movie title). Filmmakers may decide, however, that compliance is the better 
part of valor. See Michael Cieply, Sony’s ‘Moneyball’ Is Back on Track, with Aaron Sorkin Doing a 
Rewrite, N.Y. Times Media Decoder Blog ( July 9, 2009, 6:36 PM), http://mediadecoder. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/sonys-moneyball-is-back-on-track-with-aaron-sorkin-doing-
a-rewrite/ (reporting that a draft script of a movie depicting professional baseball had 
“included changes requested by Major League Baseball, which examines scripts for au-
thenticity before granting permission to use its trademarks in a film”). Such concessions 
carry an artistic cost. Grynberg, supra note 17, at 100–01. 
232 Trademark law, moreover, still has the ability to develop through operation of par-
allel state law regimes. In practice, however, the funneling of cases to federal court has led 
to a convergence of the law around federal standards. U.S. Trademark Ass’n Trademark 
Review Comm’n, supra note 219, at 377 (“[F]ederal courts now decide, under federal law, 
all but a few trademark disputes. State trademark law and state courts are less influential 
than ever.”). 
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therefore must reconcile traditional trademark understandings and 
practices with the specifics of the federal statute. The task is an appro-
priate judicial function, particularly the effort to preserve traditional 
understandings of trademark and other intellectual property re-
gimes.233 
 Problems arise when statutory text is facially inconsistent with 
common law understandings without explicitly negating them.234 Or, 
the common law may be insufficiently fixed to guide interpretation of 
the Lanham Act, fill its gaps, or establish background understandings 
against which the statute’s effect may be measured. Courts are left 
without an effective way to fill gaps short of exercising pure lawmaking 
authority. The resulting tensions evoke contested visions of what it 
means to be faithful to statutory text in the face of seemingly overriding 
policy considerations. 
 The circuit split over the ability of foreign marks to establish prior-
ity in the United States is a good example. Trademark rights are tradi-
tionally territorial, but sometimes a foreign mark achieves domestic 
fame before its holder operates in the United States. These cases sug-
gest a good policy argument for a “famous marks” exception to the ter-
ritoriality rule in these cases. As the Ninth Circuit notes, without an ex-
ception, consumers may wrongly believe that the junior, domestic user 
is actually affiliated with the seller who made the mark famous.235 The 
contrary approach is to take a strict view of the Lanham Act, which re-
flects the territoriality principle.236 This was the Second Circuit’s an-
swer.237 
 Assuming arguendo that the Ninth Circuit has policy on its side, 
we have an unedifying circuit split on how textualist courts ought to be 
                                                                                                                      
233 See supra notes 118–164 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 140–147 and accompanying text. 
235 See Grupo Gigante SA De CV v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 
2004) (“An absolute territoriality rule without a famous-mark exception would promote 
consumer confusion and fraud. . . . There can be no justification for using trademark law 
to fool immigrants into thinking that they are buying from the store they liked back 
home.”). 
236 The law has a provision allowing registration of foreign marks not currently used in 
commerce in the United States based on foreign registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006). 
237 ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The fact that a doc-
trine may promote sound policy, however, is not a sufficient ground for its judicial recogni-
tion, particularly in an area regulated by statute.”). Note, however, that the court’s inter-
pretation of the Lanham Act’s meaning relied in part on background understandings, 
specifically, the “bedrock” principle of territoriality. Id. at 164 (“Before we construe the 
Lanham Act to include such a significant departure from the principle of territoriality, we 
will wait for Congress to express its intent more clearly.”). 
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when faced with contrary policy considerations. Here, the common law 
backdrop is no help, for there is no firmly established famous marks 
exception for courts to weigh against the Lanham Act’s silence.238 
Courts cannot easily fill the policy gap without common lawmaking, 
notwithstanding recent Supreme Court skepticism of that approach.239 
If courts act, the absence of bounds to their discretion raises account-
ability issues. 
3. Delegation Mismatch 
 The problem of congressional abdication is particularly acute with 
trademark defenses. I have discussed this issue elsewhere, so I will not 
repeat the argument in great detail, except to note the nature of the 
problem.240 The Lanham Act contains both delegating and non-
delegating provisions. Its liability-creating likelihood-of-confusion stan-
dard is open text. In contrast, the statute is stingy with respect to de-
fenses or similar doctrines. 
 This would all be well and good if one takes the substantive view 
that the trademark cause of action should be as strong as possible. But 
excepting plaintiffs in the throes of briefing, nobody thinks that. Courts 
and commentators alike therefore grasp for ways to blunt the sharper 
edges of the Lanham Act. They may root these efforts in the cause of 
action itself,241 their ingenuity,242 a trademark use requirement,243 the 
                                                                                                                      
238 Id. at 159 (“[N]owhere . . . does the Trademark Board state [in earlier conflicting 
precedent] that its recognition of the famous marks doctrine derives from any provision of 
the Lanham Act or other federal law.”); id. at 165 (noting importance of “the comprehen-
sive and frequently modified federal statutory scheme for trademark protection set forth 
in the Lanham Act”). Whether New York state law would recognize the doctrine was a sep-
arate issue, and the Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Ap-
peals. ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159, 160 (2d Cir. 2008); ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, 
Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852 (N.Y. 2007). 
239 Grynberg, supra note 7, at 933–37. 
240 See id. at 945–61. 
241 The Ninth Circuit took this approach to nominative fair use. The court based pro-
tection for the right to use trademarks to refer to the trademark holder in the cause of 
action itself by defining such uses as inherently non-confusing. New Kids on the Block v. 
News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307–08 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e may generalize a class 
of cases where the use of the trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confu-
sion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one. Such nominative use 
of a mark . . . lies outside the strictures of trademark law.”); see Grynberg, supra note 7, at 
955–61, 963–69 (describing defensive doctrines rooted in cause of action). 
242 Century 21 concluded that nominative fair use is a “true” defense; that is, if there is 
a likelihood of confusion, establishment of the defense will negate liability. The court did 
not ground its holding in the Lanham Act’s text, making the opinion one in the common 
law style. See Grynberg, supra note 7, at 960–61 (discussing Century 21). 
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First Amendment, or elsewhere. Congress has not provided guidance 
regarding defensive innovations or the considerations that should 
guide them.244 
4. Excess Delegation 
 A plausible response to the Lanham Act’s contrasting treatment of 
trademark rights and limitations is to ask: What else is new? Is it surpris-
ing that defenses would be narrower than the broader liability stan-
dard? One answer, noted above, is that the potential textual scope of 
the Lanham Act’s cause of action outstrips both trademark law’s tradi-
tional bounds and consensus perspectives on the outer limits of its ap-
propriate substantive scope.245 It must be contained, if not by modify-
ing text or interpretation, then by creating defensive doctrines. This 
position seems to be an argument against trademark reform, one skep-
tical of the ability of courts to do anything about trademark’s expan-
sion. To the contrary, a renewed focus on accountability issues calls 
much of trademark’s expansion into question. The scope of the cause 
of action is too broad for courts to plausibly exercise while being true 
to trademark’s system goals. 
                                                                                                                     
 Trademark as Regulation. Intellectual property law inherently exac-
erbates the accountability issues presented by broad delegations of au-
thority to the judiciary. Intellectual property gives functional property 
rights to the creators of intangible goods.246 Traditionally, trademark 
rights resemble property rights less than their patent and copyright 
counterparts because the underlying rationales differ. Copyrights and 
patents are designed to solve a public goods problem—how will we 
have “Progress in Science and the Useful Arts”247 if the marginal cost of 
copying intangible works is zero? Our traditional answer, notwithstand-
 
243 See generally Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark 
Use,” 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 371 (2006); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding 
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1669 (2007); Uli Widmaier, Use, 
Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 Hofstra L. Rev. 603 (2004). 
244 Cf. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006) (prohibiting the Fed-
eral Trade Commission from declaring unlawful a commercial practice “unless the act or 
practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to con-
sumers or to competition”). 
245 See supra notes 224–231 and accompanying text. 
246 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall 
have the attributes of personal property.”). 
247 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
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ing some doubts,248 is to grant property-like entitlements to these works 
to ensure that authors and inventors have incentives to create.249 
 Trademark has always been based on a different theory.250 Its duel-
ing rationales of consumer and seller protection both aim at promoting 
competition, not creating an under-produced intellectual good.251 Tra-
ditional doctrine therefore resists treating trademarks as property and 
restricts rights to a mark only to the extent it is used in conjunction 
with the sale of goods and services.252 That said, trademarks still vest in 
their owners a limited right to exclude, at least with respect to uses that 
are likely to cause certain types of confusion. Trademark rights, more-
over, look more like property than they used to.253 As the plausible 
scope of actionable confusion grows, so too does trademark’s exclu-
sionary power. 
 In some ways intellectual property is more powerful than tradi-
tional property. While any entitlement can be described as a check on 
the liberty of others, property rights generally have a present effect only 
                                                                                                                      
248 See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly 
7 (2008); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photo-
copies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 284 (1970) (“Taken as a whole, the 
evidence now available suggests that, although we should hesitate to abolish copyright 
protection, we should equally hesitate to extend or strengthen it.”). 
249 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1932) (“A 
copyright, like a patent, is ‘at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed 
by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals and the incentive to further efforts 
for the same important objects.’” (quoting Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 
(1858))). 
250 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (holding that federal power to 
regulate trademark infringement could not be based in the Intellectual Property Clause). 
251 See supra notes 17–34 and accompanying text. This is the Supreme Court’s view. 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). But see David W. Barnes, A 
New Economics of Trademarks, 5 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 22, 24 (2006) (arguing that 
trademarks have public good characteristics and that because “trademark owners contrib-
ute to the store of information available for all people to use, their efforts are more similar 
to the efforts of authors and inventors than is generally recognized”). 
252 United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 97 (“There is no such thing as property in a trademark 
except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which 
the mark is employed.”). Trademark law therefore limits the ability to assign marks inde-
pendently of the underlying business or product line. 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (2006); Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 34 (1995) (stating that assignment of own-
ership is only possible when “the assignee also acquires the line of business that is 
associated with the designation or otherwise maintains continuity in the use of the desig-
nation by continuing the line of business without substantial change”). 
253 The merchandising right is a popular example. See supra notes 206–212 and ac-
companying text; see also Lunney, supra note 5, at 372 (arguing that “many courts and 
commentators succumbed to ‘property mania’ —the belief that expanded trademark pro-
tection was necessarily desirable so long as the result could be characterized as ‘prop-
erty’”). 
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on those in proximity to the land or chattel in question.254 IP rights, 
which apply to intangible matter, constrain everyone who might want to 
embody or otherwise use protected matter. In response, we may still 
call IP a property right like any other (and overlook not only the differ-
ences in its effect but also in its legal treatment).255 Or our definition of 
IP might accommodate the impact of IP on the property rights of oth-
ers, by analogizing IP to a negative easement or a nuisance regula-
tion.256 Another approach is to think of IP as a form of delegated regu-
latory power. Holders of IP entitlements are allowed to control the 
exercise of property rights of third parties in a manner normally re-
served to the state. 
 Trademark and Nondelegation. Vesting regulatory power in private 
hands exacerbates trademark’s accountability problems. A large body 
of administrative law exists to cabin and channel regulatory power 
when wielded by a government agency.257 This law not only constrains 
the regulator, but provides a principle for construing the scope of its 
delegated authority.258 The search for checks to judicial authority plays 
a similar role when it is courts who are wielding the delegated power.259 
The accountability problems of judges setting or altering the substance 
of trademark law are hardly ameliorated by vesting such power in pri-
                                                                                                                      
254 The law of nuisance spreads the power of property rights further, but through a 
doctrine in which courts balance competing interests rather than enforce absolute prop-
erty rights as they do in trespass. See Michael Grynberg, Property Is a Two-Way Street: Personal 
Copyright Use and Implied Authorization, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 435, 459–62 (2010); cf. Chris-
topher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 Cath. U. L. Rev. 61, 95 (2009) 
(“Why do we differentiate between nuisance and trespass? . . . The concern raised by such 
a drastically enforced right to exclude is that landowners would be vested with tremendous 
veto power over a wide range of uses for any neighboring land.”). 
255 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 58 Syracuse L. Rev. 
523, 532–40 (2008) (listing ways IP differs from tangible property). 
256 See Grynberg, supra note 254, at 465; Newman, supra note 254, at 106–07. 
257 In addition to the protections and limitations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), a 
range of doctrines seek to address separation of powers concerns raised by the administra-
tive state. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“[W]e re-
peatedly have said that when Congress confers decision-making authority upon agencies 
Congress must lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or 
body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.”) (alteration in original) (internal quota-
tion omitted). 
258 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (“In recent years, our appli-
cation of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of 
statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delega-
tions that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.”) (citing Industrial Union 
Dept. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980); Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n. v. 
United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974)). 
259 Lemos, supra note 67, at 448–50. 
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vate actors instead. Administrative law doctrines mediate the separation 
of powers between the executive and legislative branches, but what 
happens when non-accountable private actors effectively wield the 
power of the state? The addition of another, private, layer of regulators 
exacerbates an already difficult set of accountability issues.260 
 Focusing on accountability is therefore an argument for trademark 
reform rather than a barrier. It is not enough for Congress to “mean it” 
in inviting courts to use common law reasoning to provide content to 
the likelihood-of-confusion standard. There must be limits. If trade-
mark doctrine cannot coalesce around principles that would control 
the trademark cause of action and provide predictable boundaries that 
allow the early disposition of meritless claims, that should be seen as a 
problem for holders of trademark rights, not those they would regulate. 
Conclusion 
 Even without general common law authority, courts have room to 
develop trademark law. They set rules to supervise adjudication,261 and 
they fill the Lanham Act’s numerous gaps while trying to maintain the 
coherence and integrity of trademark law.262 When we evaluate the re-
sulting precedents, it is of course fair to care more about substantive 
effects than more abstract considerations of the judicial role and the 
operation of the legal system. If, however, we are ignorant of a court’s 
view on questions of substance, we might agree that these issues are 
important. At the very least, they provide an alternative basis for con-
sidering the development and reform of trademark law, one that judges 
with a limited interest in trademark might find relevant. 
 Looking beyond trademark substance is consistent with the goal of 
trademark reform. Considering trademark’s expansion from the per-
spective of trademark’s system goals supports critiques of trademark law 
as overreaching. In recent years, the Supreme Court has consistently 
turned aside circuit precedents that sought to expand trademark’s 
scope without support from the Lanham Act’s text.263 There remain, 
however, many doctrines developing in the circuits that are the product 
                                                                                                                      
260 Recall that holders of trademark rights may push their limits without the aid of 
judges. See supra notes 86–88 and 231 and accompanying text. And the cases that judges 
see are not necessarily representative of trademark’s place in society. See supra notes 83–85 
and accompanying text. 
261 See supra notes 91–105 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra notes 118–164 and accompanying text. 
263 See Grynberg, supra note 7, at 933-45. 
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of judicial dabbling in common lawmaking without authorization.264 
Reform efforts in the courts could focus on trademark’s limits—on 
convincing judges of the accountability and transparency problems of 
ever-expanding trademark and advocating judicial modesty where 
Congress has not enacted limiting standards. The second option is to 
encourage courts to use the same creativity that expands trademark to 
develop doctrines that would curtail it. Given the body of precedent we 
have, and the relative lack of success of reformers seeking to change 
substantive judicial views about trademark, the first option merits a 
closer look.265 And even if there is no uniformly preferable approach, 
sensitivity to questions of judicial power could be helpful in selecting 
tactics for particular battles. 
 Advocating greater judicial constraints is not to suggest that courts 
hide from reality’s messiness by making a fetish out of multifactor tests 
or any other formalist gloss on fact finding at the expense of the adjudi-
cative function. “Clean” doctrinal frameworks that work only because 
they refrain from inquiring into the facts on the ground may be no 
more than a vehicle for concealing substantive lawmaking.266 To be 
sure, they may purchase some predictability, but at a cost to accountabil-
. 
the mismatch between the Lanham Act’s open-ended cause of action 
                                                                                                                     
ity
 This suggests reasons to advocate for greater Congressional in-
volvement in trademark even if the results will not necessarily track our 
substantive preferences. This is not the first time evolving trademark 
law has outpaced its authorizing statute. In 1988, Congress ratified judi-
cial expansion of trademark law by extending the scope of the cause of 
action in section 43(a).267 Congress should confront what has hap-
pened since (e.g., further growth of the pre- and post-sale confusion 
doctrines, stronger merchandising rights) and ratify (if happy) or cur-
tail it (if not). Even if endorsement is Congress’s intent, one would 
hope that it would leave fewer open questions than its Reagan-era ef-
fort. While Congress intended for courts to continue “developing” 
trademark law, it did so using language that left courts with little guid-
ance for responding to the unforeseen challenges of the Internet or 
 
264 See supra notes 165–260 and accompanying text. 
265 Grynberg, supra note 7, at 963–69. 
266 See supra notes 173–199 and accompanying text. 
267 See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3935, 
3946 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)). 
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law.269 
                                                                                                                     
and restrictive defensive doctrines.268 The resulting delegation to 
courts and trademark owners tilted the playing field in favor of trade-
mark’s expansion while destabilizing trademark 
 Congress has options. It can create more safe harbors for accept-
able uses of trademarks, as it did when it codified the dilution cause of 
action.270 If doing so creates the risk of further curtailing judicial crea-
tivity with respect to defenses, due to the expressio unius implications 
that courts might draw from such actions, Congress could broaden its 
delegation to the courts with statutory language that grants them the 
same flexibility to craft defenses that they now enjoy with respect to li-
ability. The FTC Act offers an example of language that requires courts 
to more carefully balance claims of likely consumer confusion against 
the potential benefits to consumers of the challenged conduct.271 
 Finally, Congress could revisit what trademark law is for. The issue 
extends beyond tweaking the Lanham Act to answer specific questions 
generated by the modern marketplace. Trademark’s core policy ambi-
guities have been with us since the statute was first enacted: Do we care 
about the interests of trademark holders when they are at cross-
purposes with the interests of consumers? Should we protect goodwill 
even when doing so comes at the expense of consumer welfare? How 
do we define consumer welfare anyway? The need to interpret the like-
lihood-of-confusion standard continually raises these issues. It is well 
past time to resolve them. In the meantime, if Congress is determined 
to remain silent, the cause of trademark reform may best be served by 
convincing the courts to keep quiet too. 
 
268 Courts seem, moreover, to have been reluctant to run with existing openings. See, 
e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2009) (limiting appli-
cability of “trademark use” doctrine). 
269 See supra notes 200–260 and accompanying text. 
270 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amend-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) to make actionable acts causing a likelihood of dilution, but ex-
panding the number of statutory exclusions to liability). 
271 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
